Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of China
The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.
A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.
And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.
Now I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can't. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like -- just as a beginning.
The first is this, that China is not really a nation state. Okay, it's called itself a nation state for the last hundred years. But everyone who knows anything about China knows it's a lot older than this. This was what China looked like with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. at the end of the warring state period -- the birth of modern China. And you can see it against the boundaries of modern China. Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2,000 years ago. And you can see already it occupies most of what we now know as Eastern China, which is where the vast majority of Chinese lived then and live now.
Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it's sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It's never been the case.
So this is China, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire [Roman Empire]. It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.
The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. "Window dressing. When China gets it's hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation state mentality. But you can't run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.
Let me offer you another building block to try and understand China -- maybe not such a comfortable one. The Chinese have a very, very different conception of race to most other countries. Do you know, of the 1.3 billion Chinese, over 90 percent of them think they belong to the same race, the Han. Now this is completely different from the other world's most populous countries. India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil -- all of them are multiracial. The Chinese don't feel like that. China is only multiracial really at the margins. So the question is, why? Well the reason, I think, essentially is, again, back to the civilization state. A history of at least 2,000 years, a history of conquest, occupation, absorption, assimilation and so on, led to the process by which, over time, this notion of the Han emerged -- of course, nurtured by a growing and very powerful sense of cultural identity.
Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.
Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.
And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It's had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West.
And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. Know that China believes in the market and the state. I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, "The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe." And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.
Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C. and was finally completed in the seventh century A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is China -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.
And yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts. If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to China are incorrect -- this is the reason. Unfortunately I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It's kind of arrogant. It's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. And secondly, it's ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And Paul Cohen argues that the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it's not. In many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West, have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies. And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.
I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I'll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present. Because what's happening? Back to that chart at the beginning -- the Goldman Sachs chart. What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. We've seen this in terms of the G20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table. When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.
And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I'm afraid -- take Europe, America is slightly different -- but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Some people -- I've got an English friend in China, and he said, "The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration. But there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. Take the 19th century for example. But this, alas, is no longer true.
If you want to feel the future, if you want to taste the future, try China -- there's old Confucius. This is a railway station the like of which you've never seen before. It doesn't even look like a railway station. This is the new Guangzhou railway station for the high-speed trains. China already has a bigger network than any other country in the world and will soon have more than all the rest of the world put together. Or take this: Now this is an idea, but it's an idea to by tried out shortly in a suburb of Beijing. Here you have a megabus, on the upper deck carries about 2,000 people. It travels on rails down a suburban road, and the cars travel underneath it. And it does speeds of up to about 100 miles an hour. Now this is the way things are going to move, because China has a very specific problem, which is different from Europe and different from the United States. China has huge numbers of people and no space. So this is a solution to a situation where China's going to have many, many, many cities over 20 million people.
Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That's what Europe and North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. And we will have to learn about these civilizations.
This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic. (Laughter) Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368. I think they're playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.
Welcome to the future. Thank you.
(Applause)
這世界正在以飛快的速度發生著改變。如果你看這上面的圖表，你會發現在2025年，據高盛的預測顯示，中國經濟體的規模幾乎會與美國的一樣大。如果你來看這張2050年的圖表，它預測屆時中國經濟體的規模將是美國的兩倍，而印度經濟體規模將與美國相近。我們應該注意的是，這些預測是在西方金融危機發生之前做出的。幾周前，我在看法國巴黎銀行做出的關於中國的經濟體規模何時超越美國的最新預測。高盛當時的預測是2027年。而這份誕生於危機之後的報告的預測年份則是2020年。這就是十年之後的事情了。
中國將要從兩個最基本的方面改變世界。首先，它是一個有著13億人口的龐大的發展中國家，並已經以每年10%的經濟增長速度騰飛了30多年。而且在十年之內，它將會是世界最大的經濟體。在現代史上，還從未有過一個發展中國家，而不是發達國家，成為世界上最大的經濟體。第二，也是現代史上的第一次，世界上處主導地位的國家——我認為中國將居主導地位——不來自西方，而是來自於一個完全不同的文化根基。我知道現在在西方有一個非常流行的觀點，即認為國家的現代化等同於西方化。這是一個謬誤。這種觀點錯誤地認為現代化僅單純是競爭、市場和技術的產物。它不是。它同樣是歷史和文化所塑造的平等。中國不像西方國家，也永遠不會與之趨同。它會在很多基本的方面保持不同。現在最大的問題顯然是：我們應該怎麼讀懂中國？怎樣試著理解中國的現狀？而總體來說現在西方存在的問題是我們習慣用傳統的西方模式和思維來理解它。我們不能這樣。
“三個基礎理解中國：文明國邦，而非民族國家；漢民族為主體；家長式的政府管理”
現在，我希望提供給大家三個認識基礎，來理解中國的崛起，就像開始時一樣。第一個，中國並不是一個民族國家(nation state)。雖然它在過去的幾百年內聲稱自己是民族國家，但是對中國歷史稍有了解的人都知道它的歷史遠長於此。這是公元前221年秦在戰國末期統一中國時的版圖，即現代中國的濫觴，你可以看到它與現代中國版圖的差別。再看不久後的漢朝，也是2000年之前，它的疆域基本覆蓋了現在中國的東部地區，那也是自古以來人口的主要聚居地。非常奇怪的一點是，真正給中國民族感的，真正給中國人身份認同感的，並不像西方那樣來自於近幾百年民族國家的階段，而是來源於文明國邦（civilization state）（如果可以這樣說）的那段歷史。具體包括祖先崇拜的習俗，對國家的不同觀念，同樣地像對家庭的不同觀念，社會上的“關係”，儒家價值觀念等這些例子，這些都是從文明國家的階段形成的。換句話說，不同於西方國家和其他絕大多數國家，中國是因其對文明的歸屬感，因其文明國家而非民族國家的歷史的存在而存在的。還有一點要補充：我們當然知道不管從地理上還是人口上來說中國都是一個龐大的國家，有著十三億人口。但是我們常常忽略了一點：中國同樣非常的多樣與多元，且在很多方面非常的分散。你不能坐居北京而治理一個如此大的國家——即使我們就是這樣認為的。但是事實並非如此。
所以，這就是中國，一個文明國邦，而非民族國家。這意味著什麼？我認為這有太多深遠的隱義。我可以快速告訴你兩點。首先，對中國人來說，最重要的政治觀念就是團結，是中華文明的維護。2000年前，歐洲崩塌了，神聖羅馬帝國分裂了，並從此以後一直四分五裂。而中國，在幾乎相同的時期卻走上與歐洲截然相反的道路，艱難地將這龐大的文明體凝聚在一起。第二個可能更能反映事實，就是香港。你還記得1997年時香港從英國到中國手上的交接嗎？你可能記得中國就此的憲政理論：一國兩制。而且我打賭幾乎不會有任何西方人認為這能行得通。“只是種噱頭。當香港真的交到中國手上時，事情不會是那樣。”13年過去了，香港的政治體制與司法體制同1997年時一樣保持著獨立性。我們錯了。我們為什麼會錯？因為我們想當然地從民族國家的角度來考慮。想想1990年時德國的統一。可以說東德被西德侵吞了，一個國家，一種體制。這是民族國家的思想方式。但是你不能在一種文明、一種體制的基礎上來管理像中國這樣的文明國邦。這不管用。所以中國對香港問題的解答——這也將是它對臺灣問題的解答——是一個自然的回應：一種文明，多種政體。
讓我給你第二個試著瞭解中國的基礎吧——儘管也許並不太合適。相比其他國家，中國人有著非常不同的民族概念。你知道嗎，在13億人口中，超過90%的人口屬於同一個民族——漢族。這與世界上其他人口大國截然不同。印度、美國、印尼、巴西——它們都是多民族國家。中國人自己並不想要這樣。但中國的其他民族人數僅僅是少數。那麼問題就是，為什麼呢？我覺得，這原因很大程度上仍舊應歸咎於它是個文明國邦。一個至少2000年的歷史，一個充滿征服、佔有、吸收、同化等的歷史，使得漢民族的觀念在這過程中產生，並被不斷成長和壯大的文化歸屬感所滋養。
這種歷史經驗的好處就在於中國想要凝聚起來，必須依靠漢族。漢民族的身份認同感如水泥般將這個國家聚合起來。而這點的缺點則是漢族人文化差異的觀念很淡薄。他們沉浸於自己的優越感，並且輕視其他民族的人。這就不難解釋他們對例如維吾爾族、藏族人的態度了。
那麼讓我給你第三個基礎吧：中國的政府（state）。在中國，政府與社會的關係與西方有很大的不同。現在西方人普遍認為——至少是目前——政府的權威性與合法性來源於民主的運作。這個命題的問題在於中國的政府比任何西方政府在自己國民之間都享有更多的合法性與權威性。原因是……我認為有兩個原因，且顯然這和民主沒有什麼關係，因為在我們看來中國人並不擁有一個民主政體。首先，中國的政府被賦予了一個非常……它作為國民的代表，作為中華文化及文明國邦的體現與捍衛者，具有非同尋常的重要性。這差不多成為一種精神代表。第二個原因是，與在歐洲和北美，政府的權威總是持續地受到挑戰不同——歐洲歷史上，政府與教會、與世俗貴族勢力、與商人鬥爭中力量的此消彼長——在一千年間，中國政府的權威幾乎沒有被挑戰過。它並沒有遇到強敵。所以你可以發現中國權力結構的構建與西方歷史經驗有很大的不同。於是，這樣的結果就是中國人有非常不同的政府觀。即使我們常常將中國政府視為侵入者、陌生者、一個權力需要被限制甚至壓抑的怪物，中國人自己並不這樣看他們的政府。中國人將政府視為親切的——甚至不僅是親切的，而是像他們家庭成員一樣親密的——又不僅僅是家庭成員，而是家庭的管理者，是最大的“家長”。這就是中國人對政府的觀念——和我們的非常不同。它以一種與西方大相徑庭的方式烙印在中國社會當中。
我想提醒你我們現在是在一箇中國文化背景下思考問題，是一個全新的範式，不同於以往我們所談論過的所有。要知道中國同樣相信市場和政府，亞當·斯密在18世紀就已經寫到：“中國的市場比歐洲任何地方都更大、更發達且更復雜。”除了在毛澤東時期，這在很大程度上就是事實。但這是在一個極其強大且無所不在的政府的管理下的。政府的影響在中國無處不在。中國的龍頭企業大多數依舊是公有的。私營企業，無論它們有多龐大，像聯想，也依舊在很多方面依仗政府的支持。經濟發展的目標由政府制定。政府的控制力滲透入許多領域，比如我們所熟悉的計劃生育政策。
再者，政府一直有（修建大型基礎工程）的悠久傳統，這是一個自古以來的治國要領。如果你想要一個例子，萬里長城的修建就是。還有另一個例子，大運河，始建於公元前5世紀，完工於公元17世紀。它總長1114英里，將北京與上海、杭州相連。中國政府大興重大基礎設施是自古就有的，這就幫助我們理解三峽大壩及其他展現國力的工程修建的原因。所以我們現在已經有三個助於我們理解中國的差異性的認識基礎了：文明國邦、關於民族的概念、政府的性質及其與社會的關係。
“西方文化可能是狹隘的，而東方文化更具普世性”
但是總的來說，我們依舊執意認為我們能夠靠西方的經驗、從西方的視角、運用西方的觀念來讀懂中國。如果你想知道為什麼我們總是理解錯中國——我們對中國發展的預測總是錯誤——那這就是原因。我必須說我認為不幸的是，我們對中國的態度有些過於偏向西方思維，有些傲慢。這種傲慢是因為我們認為自己是最好的，我們掌握著普世的裁判權。二者，有些無知。我們拒絕涉及差異這一領域的問題。在保羅·科恩的《美國的歷史學家》一書中有一段非常有趣。保羅·科恩說西方可能將自己的文化看成是所有文化中最普世的了。但它不是。甚至在很多方面，西方文化是狹隘的，因為在西方在200年裡都是世界的主導，它不需要去理解其他的文化與文明。因為不管怎樣到最後，它可以依靠武力來捍衛自己的文化。然而其他文化——事實上就是世界上其他的部分——處在一個弱勢地位，面對西方的強大及其在社會生活中的滲透，這些國家被迫試著去了解西方。因此，這樣產生的結果就是，這些文化往往比西方文化更具世界性。
舉個例子，東亞問題。東亞：日本、韓朝、中國等，聚集了世界三分之一的人口，也是現在世界上最大的經濟區域。而且我要告訴你，東亞人，那些來自於東亞的人，他們瞭解西方的程度遠大於西方瞭解東亞。這有很現實的意義。恐怕就現在來說。因為現在正在發生什麼？讓我們回到開頭的那張圖表——高盛的那張圖表。正在切實發生的是就歷史學角度來說，世界正在以極快的速度被髮展中國家，而非發達國家所驅引與塑造。我們可以看到G20正在迅速地取代G7或G8的地位。
這將導致兩個後果。首先，西方正在飛速地失去它對世界的影響力。一年前的哥本哈根氣候變化大會就是一個絕佳的例子。歐洲不再是談判桌上的決定者。這種情景最近一次是在什麼時候發生？我打賭那可能是200年之前了。這就是將來將要發生的事。第二個影響就是這個世界對我們來說將不可避免地變得越來越陌生，因為它正在被我們並不瞭解甚至精通的文化、經歷與歷史所塑造。最後我恐怕得說說歐洲了（美國稍不一樣），我必須說歐洲人總的來說是無知的，是對世界正在發生改變的方式遲鈍的。一些人——我有一位在中國的英國朋友說：“這個大洲正在夢遊中走向湮沒。”或許這是對的，或許這只是個誇張。但是這有另一個問題隨之產生：歐洲正在逐漸與世界脫離。而這是一種感知未來的能力的缺失。我的意思是歐洲曾經自信滿滿地執未來之牛耳。想想19世紀的歐洲吧，而這盛景已不在了。
如果你想要感知未來，如果你想嚐嚐未來的滋味，試著瞭解中國吧——那有悠久的儒家文化。這是一個火車站，或許你們從未見過這樣的。它甚至不像一個火車站。但這就是廣州為高鐵建的新火車站。中國已經有了世界最大的鐵路網，而且即將超過世界上其他所有國家的總和。或者來看這個：這是一個新創意，但這個創意將很快在北京的一個郊區實施。這是一個巨大的巴士，上層能載2000名乘客。它從鐵軌上駛到郊區公路上，機動車可以在它下方行駛。它可以達到每小時100英里。這就是事物發展的方向，因為中國有其自身特有的麻煩，不同於歐洲和美國——中國有太多的人與太少的空間。所以這就是應對將來中國出現更多更多超過2000萬人口的城市的解決方案。
怎麼結束我的演講？當我們看到世界在我們眼前急速發展時我們該採取什麼樣的態度？我想對於我們，這有好的一面，也有不好的一面。但我想強調的是，一個總體來說積極的態度來面對世界。200年間，世界基本上被一小部分人所領導，基本來自歐洲和北美。像中國和印度——佔世界人口的38%——還有其他像印尼、巴西等，這些國家的崛起是近200年民主化歷程中最重要的篇章。那些被長久忽視的，那些長期沒有發出自己聲音的，那些沒有被好好傾聽的，那些鮮為人知的文明與文化將在世界格局中代表完全不同的一股力量。作為人道主義者，我們當然必須歡迎這種鉅變。我們也將從這些文明中學習獲益。
這艘大船是15世紀時鄭和在從南海、東海附近穿越印度洋直達東非的偉大航行中所駕駛的。而這前面的小船則是80年後，克里斯多夫·哥倫布橫跨大西洋時駕駛的。（笑聲）大家看仔細這個絲制的杆軸，這是1368年時Zhuzhou（不詳，應是明朝的畫家）畫的。我想他們應該是在打高爾夫球吧。上帝啊，竟然是中國人發明了高爾夫！
歡迎來到未來。謝謝。
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