Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2014 was $18.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 8.3%. Over the last 50 years (that is, since present management took over),per-share book value has grown from $19 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded annually.*
2014 年伯克希爾的淨值增長了 183 億美元，公司 A 類和 B 類股的每股賬面價值增長8.3%。在過去的 50 年中(即現任管理層上任以來)，公司每股賬面價值已從 19 美元增至 146186美元，年均複合增長率摺合為 19.4%。2
During our tenure, we have consistently compared the yearly performance of the S&P 500 to the change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. We’ve done that because book value has been a crude, but useful, tracking device for the number that really counts: intrinsic business value.
In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire’s assets were then largely securities whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of the assets involved in the calculation of book value were “marked to market.”
在本管理層任期之內，我們始終在以標普 500 指數的年度變化衡量伯克希爾每股賬面價 值，賬面價值指標儘管略顯粗略，但畢竟是評判公司內在價值的有用跟蹤指標。在本管理層 接手的最初歲月中，公司賬面價值與內在價值之間並無如當今所見的差距。其原因在於，當 年伯克希爾的大部分資產都是可隨時反應其當前市值的有價證券。在華爾街地界，有關資產 賬面價值的計算總是要遵循“市值”原則。
Today, our emphasis has shifted in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened.
如今公司的重點已轉向持有或經營大型企業。其資產價值遠超過基於成本計算的留存價 值。但不管這些企業的價值獲得了多大提升，其中資產價值卻從未向上調整。因此伯克希爾 本身的內在價值和賬面價值之間的差距日漸拉大。
With that in mind, we have added a new set of data – the historical record of Berkshire’s stock price – to the performance table on the facing page. Market prices, let me stress, have their limitations in the short term. Monthly or yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and not indicative of changes in intrinsic value. Over time, however, stock prices and intrinsic value almost invariably converge. Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I
believe that has been true at Berkshire: In our view, the increase in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value over the past 50 years is roughly equal to the 1,826,163% gain in market price of the company’s shares.
鑑於此，我們在首頁中的對比指標表中增列了新的數據，即伯克希爾股價的歷史變動。 在此必須強調，市場價格從短期來看是有其缺陷的。股價的月度甚至年度變動都可能是非理 性的，因此無法衡量企業內在價值的變化。但如果從長期看，股價和內在價值總是趨於吻合。 伯克希爾的副主席、我的合夥人查理-芒格以及本人均對此深信不疑:在我們看來，伯克希 爾股價在過去 50 年裡所錄得的 1826163%漲幅大致是本公司內在價值變化的公正反應。
The Year at Berkshire
伯克希爾過去一年表現
It was a good year for Berkshire on all major fronts, except one. Here are the important developments:
在過去一年，伯克希爾在幾乎所有方面都取得了不俗成績，僅有一處例外。重點成績如 下:
Our “Powerhouse Five” – a collection of Berkshire’s largest non-insurance businesses – had a record $12.4 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2014, up $1.6 billion from 2013.* The companies in this sainted group are Berkshire Hathaway Energy (formerly MidAmerican Energy), BNSF, IMC (I’ve called it Iscar in the past), Lubrizol and Marmon.
伯克希爾旗下最大的非保險企業，即“五駕馬車”，在 2014 年錄得了創歷史記錄的 124億美元稅前利潤3，較 2013 年增加 16 億美元。這五駕馬車分別是 BHE(伯克希爾•哈撒韋能 源公司，前身為中美能源)、BNSF(伯靈頓北聖達菲鐵路運輸公司)、IMC(本人曾稱其為ISCAR)、Lubrizol(路博潤)和 Marmon(瑪蒙集團)。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us a decade ago. Subsequently we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the ten-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
在這五家之中，只有去年盈利 3.93 億美元的伯克希爾•哈撒韋能源公司是十年之前就在 旗下的“老成員”。我們是用全額現金收購的方式將其餘三家收入旗下，在收購第五家BNSF(伯靈頓北聖達菲鐵路運輸公司)時，我們用現金支付了 70%的收購額，並採用增發伯 克希爾股票的方式支付餘款。為此公司股本擴大了 6.1%。換言之，公司在過去十年從這五 家公司獲得了年均 120 億美元的回報，但公司的股本僅僅出現了略微的攤薄。這樣的結果才 符合我們的目標:即不僅要增加整體盈利，而且還要增加每股營收。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2015, we expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve as well. The gain could reach $1 billion, in part because of bolt-on acquisitions by
the group that have already closed or are under contract.
如果美國經濟在 2015 年繼續復甦，我們預計來自“五駕馬車”的盈利也將繼續增長。
鑑於集團業已完成和正在進行的“補強型收購”，來自五家的盈利增幅有望達到 10 億美元。
Our bad news from 2014 comes from our group of five as well and is unrelated to earnings. During the year, BNSF disappointed many of its customers. These shippers depend on us, and service failures can badly hurt their businesses.
2014 年的壞消息也來自這五家企業，但與盈利無關。在過去一年，BNSF(伯靈頓北聖 達菲鐵路運輸公司)的服務令許多客戶失望。這些運輸企業都有賴於鐵路線的順暢運營，鐵 路線的運營不暢將嚴重損害其業務。
BNSF is, by far, Berkshire’s most important non-insurance subsidiary and, to improve its performance, we will spend $6 billion on plant and equipment in 2015. That sum is nearly 50% more than any other railroad has spent in a single year and is a truly extraordinary amount, whether compared to revenues, earnings or depreciation charges.
到目前為止，BNSF(伯靈頓北聖達菲鐵路運輸公司)依然是伯克希爾最重要的非保險類 子公司，為改善其運營表現，我們將在 2015 年投入 60 億美元。該投入超出鐵路經營企業單 年度投入歷史最高額將近 50%，因此無論從收入、盈利還是減值準備各項比較指標看，這樣 的投入都堪稱空前。
Though weather, which was particularly severe last year, will always cause railroads a variety of operating problems, our responsibility is to do whatever it takes to restore our service to industry-leading levels. That can’t be done overnight: The extensive work required to increase system capacity sometimes disrupts operations while it is underway. Recently, however, our outsized expenditures are beginning to show results. During the last three months, BNSF’s performance metrics have materially improved from last year’s figures.
當然去年天氣狀況尤為惡劣，而惡劣天氣客觀上會引發鐵路運營的各種問題，但我們將 竭盡所能將鐵路服務水準提升至行業領先水平。這當然不是一朝一夕之功:鐵路擴建升級工 程難免會影響到現有的運行。但可喜的是，對鐵路的大力投入在近期已初顯成效。BNSF(伯 靈頓北聖達菲鐵路運輸公司)去年最後一季度的運營數據較全年數據出現了明顯的改善。
Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.1 billion last year, up from $4.7 billion in 2013. Here, as with our Powerhouse Five, we expect further gains in 2015. Within this group, we have two companies that last year earned between $400 million and $600 million, six that earned between $250 million and $400 million, and seven that earned between $100 million and $250 million. This collection of businesses will increase in both number and earnings. Our ambitions have no finish line.
我們所持有的諸多小型非保險類企業在去年總共收入 51 億美元利潤，較 2013 年的 47億美元有了較大增長。與旗下五駕馬車類似，來自這些企業的盈利也有望在 2015 年繼續增 長。在這類企業中，有兩家企業盈利在 4 億至 6 億美元;有六家企業盈利在 2.5 億至 4 億美 元;另有七家盈利在 1 億至 2.5 億美元。此類企業的數量和盈利都將增長。這類企業的成長 沒有終點線。
Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in
2014 – that makes 12 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 12-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $84 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
伯克希爾的龐大保險產業在 2014 年繼續實現了承保盈利，這也是連續 13 年保持承保盈 利，此外保險浮存資金規模也繼續擴大。在過去 12 年時間裡，我們的保險浮存資金規模從410 億美元增長至 840 億美元，儘管這些資金的所有權並不在公司，但我們卻將其投資來為 伯克希爾創造盈利。儘管浮存資金的營收和規模並不納入伯克希爾的盈利，但龐大浮存資金 的存在卻可使我們持有大量資產併產生可觀投資收益。
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $24 billion during the twelve-year period, including $2.7 billion earned in 2014. And all of this began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
同時，我們在 12 年間實現了 240 億美元的承保盈利，包括 2014 年實現的 27 億美元。 而這一切的開端就是我們在 1967 年以 860 萬美元對國民賠償保險公司的收購。
While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year was particularly fruitful: We contracted for 31 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $7.8 billion in aggregate. The size of these transactions ranged from $400,000 to $2.9 billion. However, the largest acquisition, Duracell, will not close until the second half of this year. It will then be placed under Marmon’s jurisdiction.
在我和查理探尋新的併購機會的同時，我們的許多子公司也在有條不紊地開展“補強型 收購”。去年這方面的成果尤為豐碩:我們簽訂了 31 項補強型收購協議，預計耗資總額將 達到 78 億美元。這些併購交易的單個規模在 40 萬美元至 29 億美元不等。但其中最大的一 項收購，即對金霸王(Duracell)收購案，預計要等到今年下半年才可完成。Duracell 在收購完 成後將歸入瑪蒙集團。
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us aren’t.) They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. This means no more work for us, yet more earnings, a combination we find particularly appealing. We will make many more of these bolt-on deals in future years.
我和查理都鼓勵補強型收購，只要價格合理(大部分併購的要約價格並不合理)。這些並 購對象所投資的業務正好與我們的現有業務配套，併購之後將由我們的專業管理團隊接管。 這意味著我們無需大費周章去整合即可獲得盈利回報，對於這樣的天然搭配我們總是樂見其 成。在未來，我們將繼續開展大量的補強併購。
Two years ago my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann, asked Berkshire to join his 3G Capital group in the acquisition of Heinz. My affirmative response was a no-brainer: I knew immediately that this partnership would work well from both a personal and financial standpoint. And it most definitely has.
兩年之前，我的好友豪爾赫-保羅-雷曼(Jorge Paulo Lemann)邀請伯克希爾參與其 3G 資 本集團對亨氏集團的收購。對此我毫無猶豫地表示同意:當時我就知道，無論從個人關係角 度還是財務投資角度看，本次合併必然順利舒心。最後事情發展也大致如此。
I’m not embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better under Alex Behring, Chairman, and Bernardo Hees, CEO, than would be the case if I were in charge. They hold themselves to extraordinarily high performance standards and are never satisfied, even when their results far exceed those of competitors.
在此我必須承認，由董事長畢林(Alex Behring)和首席執行官貝爾納多-赫斯(Bernardo Hees)搭檔管理亨氏集團要遠遠好過讓我赤膊上陣。即便當他們的業績遠遠超越同行，他們 還是為自己設定了嚴苛標準並且從不自滿。
We expect to partner with 3G in more activities. Sometimes our participation will only involve a financing role, as was the case in the recent acquisition of Tim Hortons by Burger King. Our favored arrangement, however, will usually be to link up as a permanent equity partner (who, in some cases, contributes to the financing of the deal as well). Whatever the structure, we feel good when working with Jorge Paulo.
我們還將與 3G 資本繼續合作。有時我們只是扮演財務投資人的角色，例如在最近漢堡 王對 Tim Hortons 咖啡連鎖店的收購案中。當然我們青睞的方式還是成為永久股權投資者(當 然在某些案例中，股權投資者也要為併購出資)。但不管具體併購結構如何，我們對與豪爾 赫-保羅和合作感到十分高興。
Berkshire also has fine partnerships with Mars and Leucadia, and we may form new ones with them or with other partners. Our participation in any joint activities, whether as a financing or equity partner, will be limited to friendly transactions.
伯克希爾也和 Mar(瑪氏)及 Leucadia 保持了良好的夥伴關係，我們也將與這些夥伴或其 他夥伴結成新的合作關係。但不管是作為純粹的財務投資者還是股權夥伴，我們都希望所參 與的任何交易都是友善和諧的。
In October, we contracted to buy Van Tuyl Automotive, a group of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well-run. Larry Van Tuyl, the company’s owner, and I met some years ago. He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, its home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently completed, and we are now “car guys.”
10 月份，我們簽署了收購 Van Tuyl 汽車經銷網絡，該網絡有 78 家汽車經銷商且運營良 好。在若干年前，我曾與該公司的所有者拉里·圖伊爾(Larry Van Tuyl)有過一面之緣。當時 他決定說，如果某天他要賣掉公司，那麼他希望買家就是伯克希爾。本次收購在近期已經完 成，現在我們也算是“汽車人”了。
Larry and his dad, Cecil, spent 62 years building the group, following a strategy that made owner-partners of all local managers. Creating this mutuality of interests proved over and over to be a winner. Van Tuyl is now the fifth-largest automotive group in the country, with per-dealership sales figures that are outstanding.
拉里(Larry)和他的父親塞西爾(Cecil Tuyl)用了 62 年時間來建立起這樣的產業，他們的 策略就是讓所有的本地管理人員都成為最後的股東和和合夥人。這樣的策略幫助該公司應對 了無數的風雨挑戰。Van Tuyl 目前是全美第五大汽車經銷集團，單位經銷商的銷售額遠超行 業平均。近年來，Jeff Rachor 正輔佐著拉里(Larry)，這樣的搭配還將持續。
In recent years, Jeff Rachor has worked alongside Larry, a successful arrangement that will continue. There are about 17,000 dealerships in the country, and ownership transfers always require approval by the relevant auto manufacturer. Berkshire’s job is to perform in a manner that will cause manufacturers to welcome further purchases by us. If we do this – and if we can buy dealerships at sensible prices – we will build a business that before long will be multiples the size of Van Tuyl’s $9 billion of sales.
目前全美國有 17000 家汽車經銷商，而經銷商所有權的變更總是要獲得汽車製造商的同 意。伯克希爾所要做的，就要是要讓汽車製造商支持伯克希爾去收購更多的汽車經銷商。如 果我們做到這一點，我們能以合理的價格去收購更多的汽車經銷商，那麼我們的汽車經銷業 務規模將很快會在 Van Tuyl 每年 90 億美元銷售額的基礎上出現爆發式的增長。
With the acquisition of Van Tuyl, Berkshire now owns 91⁄2companies that would be listed on the Fortune 500 were they independent (Heinz is the 1⁄2). That leaves 4901⁄2fish in the sea. Our lines are out.
在收購完成 Van Tuyl 之後，如果旗下企業都算作獨立企業，那麼伯克希爾目前已持有 《財富》500 強企業中的“九家半”(Heinz (亨氏集團)算半家)。這意味著我們還有 490 家半 等著去收購。此言既出，駟馬難追!
Our subsidiaries spent a record $15 billion on plant and equipment during 2014, well over twice their depreciation charges. About 90% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we will always invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunities runs through America. The treasures that have been uncovered up to now are dwarfed by those still untapped. Through dumb luck, Charlie and I were born in the United States, and we are forever grateful for the staggering advantages this accident of birth has given us.
2014 年，我們的子公司總計在生產設備上投入了創紀錄的 150 億美元，超過折舊費用 兩倍多。其中大約有 90%的資金是用在了美國國內。儘管我們會開展海外投資，但公司發展 機遇的主脈還是在美國。我們深信，與依然潛藏在地下的寶藏規模相比，目前所開採的寶藏 僅為滄海一粟。蒼天垂青，我和查理生來就是美國公民，我們對此如天賜之福般的“美國人 優勢”永懷感念。
Berkshire’s yearend employees – including those at Heinz – totaled a record 340,499, up 9,754 from last year. The increase, I am proud to say, included no gain at headquarters (where 25 people work). No sense going crazy.
伯克希爾的年終員工總數，如果將 Heinz (亨氏集團)的包括在內，達到了 340499 人，這 比一年前增加了 9754 人。在此更要自豪指出，公司總部人數並未增加(依然停留在 25 人)。 諸位不必驚慌。
Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 7.8% versus 6.3% at yearend 2013). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola, American Express and Wells Fargo raised our percentage ownership of each. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.1% to 9.2%, our interest in American Express increased from 14.2% to 14.8% and our ownership of Wells Fargo grew from 9.2% to 9.4%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each
increase of one-tenth of a percent in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by $50 million.
去年伯克希爾對“四大投資對象”均有增持，即美國運通、可口可樂、IBM 和富國銀 行。我們增持了 IBM 的股票(持股比例從 2013 年底的 6.3%上升至去年底的 7.8%)，此外我 們在可口可樂、美國運通和富國銀行的持股比例也有了增加。我們在可口可樂公司的持股比 例從 9.1%增加到了 9.2%，在美國運通的持股比例從 14.2%增加到了 14.8%，在富國銀行的 持股比例從 9.2%增加到了 9.4%。在此千萬不要小看百分比中小數點後面位數的變化:四家 企業加總，我們對其持股比例每上升 0.1 個百分點，伯克希爾每年就可多拿到 5000 萬美元 的盈利。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
這四家企業的業務成熟，其管理層能力出眾且注重股東利益。對於伯克希爾來說，我們 寧可去參股一家偉大的企業，也不願意去絕對控股一家泛泛之輩。所謂寧要鮮桃一口，不要 爛杏一筐。
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2014 earnings before discontinued operations amounted to $4.7 billion (compared to $3.3 billion only three years ago). In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.6 billion last year. (Again, three years ago the dividends were $862 million.) But make no mistake: The $3.1 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
如果按照伯克希爾對四大投資對象的年終持股比例看，四大投資對象企業在 2014 年所 產生的常規經營利潤中應有 47 億美元屬於我們(三年之前是 33 億美元)。但在盈利報告中， 我們僅僅將獲得的分紅計算在內，即去年獲得了 16 億美元的分紅(三年前的分紅是 8.62 億美 元)。但在此不可混淆:未記錄在本集團盈利報告中的 31 億美元與納入盈利報告的資金同樣 可觀。
The earnings these investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that enhances Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. Their retained earnings also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time(though 2015 will be a tough year for the group, in part because of the strong dollar). If the expected gains materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains. (For the package of four, our unrealized gains already totaled $42 billion at yearend.)
四家企業所留存的利潤通常會用來回購自身股票，這意味著我們不費一分一釐就可增加 未來的盈利分成。或者這四家企業也會用留存利潤開展新的投資，通常這些投資會取得成功。 不管如何，最終在這四大投資對象中的整體每股盈利都會隨著時間的推移而不斷提高(儘管2015 年可能會充滿挑戰，因為美元走強不利於這四家企業的國際化業務)。如果這些預期的 增長都可實現，那麼伯克希爾的分紅也將隨之增長，更為重要的是，我們在這些企業的未兌 現資本也將增值(截至去年底，我們在這四家企業中的未兌現資本收益已經達到 420 億美元)。
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash.
我們在資本配置方面的靈活性，即我們願意將大量資金投入到不直接控制的企業中，這 使得我們與某些企業相比具有了強大的優勢，因為那些企業只願意投資於能直接經營的產 業，從而捆住了自己的手腳。我們對直接經營和財務投資的靈活姿態為資金的妥善使用加上 了雙保險，充沛的伯克希爾現金流總能找到用武之地。
I’ve mentioned in the past that my experience in business helps me as an investor and that my investment experience has made me a better businessman. Each pursuit teaches lessons that are applicable to the other. And some truths can only be fully learned through experience. (In Fred Schwed’s wonderful book, Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?, a Peter Arno cartoon depicts a puzzled Adam looking at an eager Eve, while a caption says, “There are certain things that cannot be adequately explained to a virgin either by words or pictures.” If you haven’t read Schwed’s book, buy a copy at our annual meeting. Its wisdom and humor are truly priceless.)
我曾說過，我在生意上的經驗對我的投資有所幫助，而我的投資經驗反過來又讓我成為 更好的生意人。二者的經驗是互通的。有一些真理只能通過實踐才能徹底領悟。(弗雷德·施 韋德(Fred Schwed)佳作《客戶的遊艇在哪兒?》中有一副彼得·阿諾(Peter Arno)的漫畫，畫 中懵懂的亞當看著好奇的夏娃，文字說明是“有一些事情無論通過文字還是圖片都無法讓一 位處女徹底明白”。如果你沒有讀過施韋德的書，我們年會上有賣。此書的智慧和幽默真是 無價之寶。)
Among Arno’s “certain things,” I would include two separate skills, the evaluation of investments and the management of businesses. I therefore think it’s worthwhile for Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our two investment managers, to each have oversight of at least one of our businesses. A sensible opportunity for them to do so opened up a few months ago when we agreed to purchase two companies that, though smaller than we would normally acquire, have excellent economic characteristics. Combined, the two earn $100 million annually on about $125 million of net tangible assets.
除了阿諾的“確定的事情”，我認為還需要兩項單獨的技能:對投資品的估值以及企業 管理能力。因此我認為我們兩位投資經理多德·庫姆斯(Todd Combs)和泰德·威施勒(Ted Weschler)有能力至少管理我們的一項業務。幾個月之前一個很好的機會讓他們可以做到這一 點，因為我們同意收購兩家業務上很有特點的公司。這兩家比我們一般收購的公司規模要小 一些，加起來淨有形資產大約 1.25 億美元，年收益 1 億美元。
I’ve asked Todd and Ted to each take on one as Chairman, in which role they will function in the very limited way that I do with our larger subsidiaries. This arrangement will save me a minor amount of work and, more important, make the two of them even better investors than they already are (which is to say among the best).
我要求多德(Todd)和泰德(Ted)各擔任一家公司的董事長。以董事長的角色，他們的用武 之地非常有限，就像我在我們較大的子公司中那樣。這種安排為我分擔了一點工作，更重要 的是，可以讓這兩位已經出類拔萃的投資者更加優秀。
Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest
purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
2009 年底，在“大衰退”的陰霾中，我們同意收購 BNSF (伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路公司)。 這是伯克希爾歷史上規模最大的一筆收購。當時我將這筆交易形容為“用全部身家賭美國經 濟前景”。
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us. We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too: Charlie and I have always considered a“bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
類似的押寶對我們來說並不是頭一遭。早在 1965 年，巴菲特合夥人公司收購伯克希爾 控股權就是類似的賭注。同樣，根據充分的理由，查理和我向來認為，“賭”美國繼續繁榮 下去是確定性非常高的事情。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 238 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. In my lifetime alone, real per-capita U.S. output has sextupled. My parents could not have dreamed in 1930 of the world their son would see. Though the preachers of pessimism prattle endlessly about America’s problems, I’ve never seen one who wishes to emigrate (though I can think of a few for whom I would happily buy a one-way ticket).
如果不信，你去問問在過去 238 年中，有誰是通過押注美國衰落而成功的?將我們國家 的現狀與 1776 年對比一下，你簡直不敢相信自己的眼睛。就我的有生之年來講，美國的人 均產出翻了 6 倍。我的父母在 1930 年絕對想象不到他們的兒子今天所看到的世界。雖然那 些悲觀主義傳教士沒完沒了地說美國存在這樣那樣的問題，我沒有看見他們中哪個真的希望 移民到國外(雖然我能夠想到幾個而且很樂意為他們購買單程機票)。
The dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. Gains won’t come in a smooth or uninterrupted manner; they never have. And we will regularly grumble about our government. But, most assuredly, America’s best days lie ahead.
我們市場經濟的動力機制仍將繼續發揮它的魔力。要收穫總要經歷挫折，不可能一帆風 順。人們會時不時抱怨政府。但確定無疑的是，美國的明天會更好。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
在這種有利形勢下，查理和我希望通過以下途徑提升伯克希爾的每股內在價值:(1)持 續改善我們眾多子公司的基本盈利能力;(2)通過補強型收購進一步提升它們的盈利;(3)從 我們投資對象的增長中獲益;(4)當伯克希爾股價大幅低於內在價值時進行股份回購;(5)偶 爾進行大規模收購。我們還會嘗試通過增發伯克希爾股份讓你的收益最大化，不過這種做法
11
就算有也是偶爾為之。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
我們都知道，搭積木關鍵在於基礎穩固。一個世紀之後，BNSF(伯靈頓北方聖達菲鐵路 公司)和 BHE(伯克希爾•哈撒韋能源公司)仍將繼續在美國經濟中扮演重要角色。住房和汽車 仍將是大部分家庭生活的中心。保險無論對企業還是個人都將依然不可或缺。展望未來，查 理和我看到伯克希爾仍將大有用武之地。我們對受託管理伯克希爾深感榮幸。
Intrinsic Business Value
企業內在價值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 123-124.
雖然查理和我經常提到內在企業價值，我們無法準確地告訴你伯克希爾股票的內在價值 是多少(事實上任何其他股票都是如此)。不過，在 2010 年的年度報告中，我們提出了內在 價值的三大要素，其中之一是定性的，另兩個是定量的。我們認為這三大要素是合理估算伯 克希爾內在價值的關鍵。本報告在 123-124 頁完全複製了這部分討論。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2014 our per-share investments increased 8.4% to $140,123, and our earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 19% to $10,847 per share.
下面是兩個定量要素的最新估算:2014 年我們的每股投資增長 8.4%至 140123 美元，除 保險和投資之外的業務利潤增長 19%至每股 10847 美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 44 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main focus is to build operating earnings. That’s why we were pleased to exchange our Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings stock for operating businesses last year and to contract with Procter and Gamble to acquire Duracell by means of a similar exchange set to close in 2015.
從 1970 年到現在，我們的每股投資以 19%的複合年率增長，我們的盈利增長率是 20.6%。 如此一來，在隨後的 44 年中，伯克希爾股價以與兩個價值衡量標準類似的速度增長也就不 足為奇了。查理和我希望看到兩部分都能夠增長，但我們主要的精力放在提升運營利潤上面。 這正是為何去年我們選擇用 Phillips 66 和 Graham Holdings 的股票來換取運營業務，並通過 類似的手段從寶潔手中收購 Duracell (金霸王)，後者將在 2015 年完成交易。
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
現在，讓我們審視我們經營的四大領域。它們的資產負債表和收入特點彼此都存在巨大 差異。因此我們將它們作為四個業務分別表述，這也是我和查理看待它們的方式。(雖然它 們共處伯克希爾一個屋簷下卻擁有極其重要和持久不衰的優勢。)
Insurance
保險業
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation. That industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.
首先是保險業務，這是公司核心業務。自 1967 年以來，保險業務一直是公司業績增長 的關鍵引擎。當時我們以 860 萬美元的價格收購 National Indemnity 和 National Fire &Marine。 這筆收購對於公司的意義十分深遠，雖然過程十分簡單。
Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a public accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.
我的朋友，這兩家公司的實際控股股東傑克·林格沃特(Jack Ringwalt)來到我的辦公室 表示希望出售公司，15 分鐘後我們就達成一致。傑克的公司並沒有接受外部公司的審計， 我也沒有對此做出任何要求。這是因為 1)傑克是個誠實的人，2)如果收購過程過於繁瑣的 話，他可能就會放棄交易。
On pages 128-129, we reproduce the 11⁄2-page purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berkshire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.
(在完整年報的 128-129 頁，我們複製了當年的簽約合同。)收購合約就這樣完成了，雙 方都沒有律師到場。這筆交易是伯克希爾最成功一筆交易，至今為止 National Indemnity 的 美國公允會計準則(GAAP)淨值達到 1110 億美元，超過了全球其他任何一家保險公司。
One reason we were attracted to the property-casualty business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others.
公司介入財產意外險的一個重要原因是其獨特的金融特性。保險公司可先收取保費，然 後支付賠償金。在極端情況下，比如工傷賠償，保險公司支付的持續過程可能會數十年之久。 這種先收錢後賠錢的模式可讓保險公司擁有大量現金，也就是所謂的浮存金。
Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit.Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
公司可利用浮存金進行投資並獲取收益。儘管個人保單處於不斷變化的狀態，但是整體 浮存金的規模通常都會和保費保持相對穩定的比例。因此長期來看，我們的業務和浮存金都 保持持續增長。以下是 1920-2014 年公司浮存金的規模:
未完待續……
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