美国译者 王为
文中黑字部分为原文，蓝字部分为译文，红字部分为译者注释或补充说明
How the Saudi Decision to Launch a Price War Is Reshaping the Global Oil Market
by Lutz Killian
In the second week of March, the already fragile global oil market was rocked by Saudi Arabia’s announcement that it would expand oil production to unprecedented levels, signaling an end to its price cooperation with Russia. In response, Russia announced that it would boost oil output as well, albeit to a much smaller extent.
在三月份的第二个星期，已脆弱不堪的全球石油市场被沙特阿拉伯将把本国石油产量增至前所未有水平的一纸声明掀了个翻天覆地，这意味着沙特将终止与俄罗斯原先达成的护价联盟关系。作为回应，俄罗斯也宣布将增产石油，尽管增产幅度要小得多。
Saudi Arabia’s decision was a response to the dislocation in the global oil market caused by the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) against the backdrop of an already weak global economy. It is unclear whether this decision will yield better outcomes for Saudi Arabia than its passive accommodation of other oil producers did after the last global oil price decline, which started in June 2014.
沙特的增产决定是对全球石油市场因新冠疫情影响而陷入混乱所做的回应，而与此同时全球经济增长的势头已开始出现放缓。目前尚不清楚，这一决策是否会达到沙特想要实现的目的抑或导致像2014年6月开始的上一次全球油价暴跌期间一样沙特不得不被动适应其他产油国节奏的局面。
The resulting drop in the oil price from about $35 to near $20 has further exacerbated the financial stress experienced by U.S. oil producers in Texas, Oklahoma and other oil-producing regions, which were already reeling from sharp reductions in fuel demand caused by the coronavirus (Chart 1).
价格战导致油价从约35美元跌至20美元附近，进一步加剧了美国德克萨斯州、俄克拉荷马州和其他产油地区石油开采企业的财务紧张状况，这些地区已经被新冠疫情导致的能源需求大跌搅得心烦意乱了，见下图1。
图中蓝线为西得克萨斯轻质原油的价格，红线为布伦特油价
Who Is Best Prepared for the Long Haul?
谁做好了长期抗战的准备？
In a world of contracting oil demand, one might expect producers with the lowest breakeven price to survive and those with high breakeven prices to exit the market. The breakeven price is the oil price at which production becomes profitable. If a low-cost producer participates in a coordinated production cut, that producer cedes market share to less-competitive producers and effectively subsidizes these higher-cost producers. Not surprisingly, no competitive oil producer is keen on being in that position.
在石油需求下降的今天，可以想见保本点最低的产油国会侥幸活下来，而保本点较高的产油国会不得不黯然离场。一个产油国的保本点是指能覆盖该国石油开采成本的市场油价，如果一家低成本的产油国参与联合减产，那么等于是将本国的市场份额让给了竞争力较弱的对手且实际上是在补贴这些高成本的产油国。因此很自然地可以看到，没有哪家具有很强成本竞争力的产油国会热衷于联合减产。
This raises the question of who the most competitive oil producers are. Saudi Arabia is commonly thought to be able to produce oil at a price as low as $10 per barrel from some fields, with Russia arguably requiring an average price of $20 or $30. These numbers have not been independently verified, but we can say with some confidence that Saudi Arabia’s cost of production tends to be lower than Russia’s and that both countries have comparatively low costs by international standards.
这就带来一个问题：哪个产油国的成本竞争力最强？通常认为沙特某些油田的产油成本能低到每桶10美元，而俄罗斯可能需要油价达到每桶20-30美元才行。这些数据未经独立的第三方校验过，但我们有把握认为沙特的产油成本一般会比俄罗斯低一些，但按国际通行的标准来衡量，这两国的产油成本都是相对比较低的。
The focus on production costs does not tell the full story, however, because both Saudi Arabia and Russia need a high enough price not only to recoup their production costs, but also to cover their governments’ fiscal deficits. The “cost” of maintaining the political regimes in Saudi Arabia and Russia is substantially higher than their cost of oil production would suggest.
但光盯着石油开采成本还不能说明全部问题，因为不管是沙特还是俄罗斯都需要油价升得足够高才行，这样不仅能弥补石油开采成本，而且还能填补各自的政府预算赤字，沙特和俄罗斯维持体制运作所需的成本远高于石油开采的成本。
For example, it is widely believed that Russia requires $45 per barrel or higher to break even fiscally, while Saudi Arabia requires an even higher price in the long run. While oil producers may adjust their budgets to some extent, this tends to undermine their domestic political support and their ability to intervene in neighboring countries.
比如，市场普遍认为俄罗斯需要每桶油价不低于45美元才能实现预算平衡，而沙特要想达此目的则需要油价长期处于更高的水平。虽然产油国会在一定程度上对预算计划进行调整，但这往往会导致其国内的政治基础不稳以及对邻国的干涉能力下降。
This comparison is further complicated by the fact that it is possible for an oil producer with large hard-currency reserves (or with access to external borrowing) to sustain a price war for months or years, even as the oil price falls below production costs. Both Russia and Saudi Arabia have been building a war chest of hard-currency reserves. Russia is believed to have a cushion of $436 billion as of January 2020, whereas Saudi Arabia retains a cushion of $491 billion, down from a peak of over $725 billion in June 2014.
令这一比较变得更加复杂的是，一个有巨额硬通货外汇储备或有能力从外部借到大量资金的产油国很有可能抗得住为期几个月甚至几年的价格战，即使市场油价比石油开采成本还低。沙特和俄罗斯均设有专项外汇储备，据信俄罗斯的外汇储备在2020年月份达到了4360亿美元，而沙特的外汇储备为4910亿美元，低于2014年6月创下的7250亿美元的峰值。
Finally, Saudi Arabia enjoys the added advantage that it can partially compensate for lower oil prices by exporting larger quantities, while Russia lacks the spare capacity for large production increases. Russia, on the other hand, may benefit from a decline in the value of the ruble relative to the U.S. dollar as the dollar price of oil declines, which lowers the cost of paying domestic oil workers. This makes it difficult to predict whether Saudi Arabia or Russia will blink first in this test of wills.
最后，沙特有一项独具的优势，该国可以通过增加原油出口量从而在一定程度上弥补低油价带来的不利影响，而俄罗斯大幅度增产的潜力并不大。但另一方面，俄罗斯则会从油价下跌导致的卢布对美元汇率贬值中获益，因俄罗斯的石油工人拿的是卢布作为薪酬，卢布贬值会降低以美元计价的人工成本，这样就很难预测沙特和俄罗斯中谁先在这场意志的较量中怂下来。
U.S. Oil Producers in a Weak Position
美国的石油生产企业是弱势的一方
The production costs of U.S. oil producers, as in other countries, vary from one location to another and, in addition, from one firm to the next. A recent survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas shows that the breakeven price of oil producers in the district ranges from $46 per barrel to $52 per barrel, with an average close to $49. This means that few oil producers will be profitable if oil prices stay below $30 for the remainder of the year. Unprofitable companies will be unable to attract enough capital to continue operations.
像其他国家一样，美国各地区之间以及各石油生产企业之间的产油成本也有很大差异。有达拉斯联储近期举办的一项调查结果显示，达拉斯联储所辖区域的石油生产企业的保本点在每桶46至52美元之间，平均成本接近49美元。这就意味着如果油价在今年剩下的时间里维持在低于30美元的水平，没有哪家石油开采商能实现盈利，赚不到钱的石油生产企业将无法筹措到足够的资本以维持运营。
Unlike the state-owned oil companies in OPEC countries, U.S. oil producers are not state actors and cannot count on government subsidies when oil prices fall. Even though the Trump administration has reportedly considered low-interest government loans to oil companies affected by the price war, any such aid would pale in comparison to the subsidies available to the state-owned oil companies of Saudi Arabia and Russia.
与欧佩克国家的石油公司都是国有的不同，美国采油企业都是民营的，在油价下跌的时候不能指望政府会提供财政补贴。即使有报道称特朗普政府考虑向受价格战影响的石油开采商提供低息的政府贷款，但此类财政援助的规模无法与俄罗斯和沙特给国有石油公司补贴的力度相提并论。
Thus, a year of global oil prices at or below $30 is expected to push many U.S. oil companies into bankruptcy. Prolonged lower prices would accelerate this process. Consolidation in the U.S. shale oil industry is likely to be limited by the prospect of low future oil prices and the lack of capital for major acquisitions among the surviving companies.
因此，如果油价在30美元以下持续停留一年预计将导致许多美国采油企业走向破产，油价长期处于低位会加速这一进程。美国页岩油开采行业强化经营体质的能力有可能比较有限，因为一是油价未来可能会处于低位，二是存活下来的油企缺乏足够的资金开展大规模的并购。
What’s the Endgame?
结果将如何？
It stands to reason that Saudi Arabia and Russia would terminate the price war as soon as U.S. shale oil production has been greatly diminished. This would provide an opportunity for coordinated supply cuts among the remaining oil producers and for persistently higher oil prices.
按照常理，只要美国页岩油的开采量大幅下降，俄罗斯和沙特就应该会停止价格战，这有可能是在现有的产油国之间达成联合减产协议以及油价开始持续走高的一个契机。
As prices rise, however, capital markets would view U.S. oil producers as financially viable once again, making an eventual U.S. shale oil production comeback likely. Thus, it seems unlikely that this price war will permanently vanquish the U.S. shale oil sector.
但如果油价回升，资本市场会对美国采油企业的财务状况再次寄予厚望，最终有可能导致美国页岩油的开采量反弹回来。因此，当前这场价格战看起来似乎不会永久性地击垮美国的页岩油开采行业。
Moreover, a Saudi victory may prove to be Pyrrhic. Saudi Arabia already experienced a major drawdown in its foreign exchange reserves following the sharp decline in the price of oil after June 2014. If Saudi Arabia exhausts its hard-currency reserves with an extended price war, it will be unable to similarly threaten U.S. shale oil producers and other oil producers in the future. Thus, the global oil market will never be the same.
此外，沙特即使在价格战中暂时取胜最终也有可能被证明是一场“得不偿失的胜利”。在2014年6月油价暴跌之后，沙特的外汇储备已经经历过一次大幅缩水了。如果沙特在一场久拖不决的石油价格战中耗尽外汇储备，那么同样也将无法在未来撼动美国页岩油开采企业以及其他采油国的地位。这样一来，全球石油市场永远不可能回到从前了。
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