Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS
Your Excellencies
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,
Good evening
Welcome to Singapore and to the 18th edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue.
The view from Singapore and Southeast Asia
Our world is at a turning point. Globalisation is under siege. Tensions between the US and China are growing. Like everyone else, we in Singapore are anxious. We wonder what the future holds, and how countries can collectively find a way forward to maintain peace and prosperity in the world.
What can the history of Southeast Asia tell us about avoiding upheavals and disasters in our path ahead? This year, Singapore is commemorating our Bicentennial. 200 years ago, Stamford Raffles, an Englishman, landed in Singapore and founded a trading post here. The Dutch had already colonised the Dutch East Indies, so the British were actually latecomers to Southeast Asia. Raffles was Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, on the west coast of Sumatra. He saw the trade potential of the region, and decided to look for a new outpost for the British East India Company along the Straits of Malacca. He chose Singapore, and that changed our destiny.
The Dutch protested Raffles’ action furiously, but in vain. To preserve their monopoly, the Dutch had either prohibited foreign ships from operating in their ports, or imposed high tariffs. Raffles took a different approach. He set up Singapore as a free port. Trade boomed, and the settlement prospered. The more open approach of the British delivered superior results.
Over the next century, Southeast Asia was divided between the British, Dutch, Spanish, French, and later the Americans. Their rivalry was intense. No single colonial power dominated the whole region.
In the 20th century, the interests of big powers continued to intersect in Southeast Asia. In 1941, Imperial Japan invaded French Indochina. The US retaliated with an oil embargo on Japan. This was the immediate trigger for the Pacific War. On the same day that Japan bombed Pearl Harbour, they also attacked Malaya and Singapore. There followed for us the Japanese Occupation: three years and eight months of oppression, fear, and misery.
During the Cold War, Southeast Asia was again on the frontline. The region was split between communist and non-communist states. Vietnam became the battlefield for a proxy war between the two camps. Meanwhile, China supported communist insurgencies and promoted armed revolution in the non-communist countries, including Malaysia and Singapore.
This was the backdrop when the five non-communist countries in Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – came together to form ASEAN in 1967. It was a remarkable act of statesmanship. Several of the partners had a recent history of conflict with one another, and the wounds had yet to heal fully. But with ASEAN, the five countries eschewed conflict, and took the path of dialogue, cooperation and friendship. We integrated into the world economy, linked up with advanced countries, and thrived. Meanwhile, the communist countries in Indochina were held back for decades by successive wars and the rigidity of their command economies.
After the Cold War ended, the US became the sole superpower. Southeast Asia entered a new phase. The Indochinese wars finally ended, and the communist countries opened up. Earlier, Vietnam had invaded Cambodia, thus posing a serious threat to its non-communist neighbours. But now Vietnam joined ASEAN, together with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. It was a case of beating swords into ploughshares.
Over the next decades, Southeast Asia benefited from a favourable external environment. The US was the dominant power in the Asia Pacific, and a stabilising security presence. International trade was expanding rapidly. Trade barriers came down, often led by the United States. The ASEAN economies prospered through export-led growth and foreign investments. International frameworks like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established rules, managed conflict, balanced competing interests, and fostered cooperation between countries big and small. Initially China played only a minor economic role, but as its economy took off, it became a growing partner of the ASEAN countries, and a major participant in regional affairs.
US-China relations
I recount this history to show that Southeast Asia is no stranger to the great game of nations, and to offer some historical perspective on the current strategic situation. The US-China bilateral relationship is the most important in the world today. How the two work out their tensions and frictions will define the international environment for decades to come.
The relationship has already altered significantly. China has totally changed since it started opening up forty years ago. Its GDP per capita has grown by more than 25 times in real terms. China is now the second largest economy in the world.
On many counts, China’s growth is a tremendous boon, both to itself and the world. China has substantially transformed its backward, centrally-planned economy into a middle-income, market-driven one, even though it is still far from being a full market economy. More than 850 million Chinese people have been lifted out of poverty, an achievement unprecedented in human history.
China’s development and success has benefited the world too. China has become a massive production and manufacturing base, lowering costs for the world’s producers, first for labour-intensive goods, and now increasingly for high value and technology-intensive production. It is also a huge market, importing everything from commodities and electronic components to aircraft and fine wines. On the consumer side, billions of people worldwide buy all manner of products, from Barbie dolls and basketballs to drones and mobile phones, made in China, though often incorporating foreign components and technology.
Imagine, conversely, had China remained closed and undeveloped. A failing China would have exported many problems to the world, quite possibly still including armed revolution. Its huge population would have been resentful and restless at being left behind by other countries. A generation ago, when China was still poor, Deng Xiaoping was asked by US President Jimmy Carter to allow more people to emigrate. He answered: “Well, Mr President, how many Chinese nationals do you want? Ten million? Twenty million? Thirty million?”
China’s success has enabled the world to avoid this disastrous outcome. At the same time, China’s growth has shifted the strategic balance and the economic centre of gravity of the world, and the shift continues.
Both China and the rest of the world have to adapt to this new reality. China has to recognize that it is in a totally new situation created by its own success. China can no longer expect to be treated the same way as in the past when it was much smaller and weaker. China may still be decades away from becoming a fully developed advanced country, but it cannot wait decades before taking on larger responsibilities.
Having gained much from the international system, China now has a substantial stake in upholding it, and making the system work for the global community. Chinese leaders have spoken up strongly in support of globalisation and a rules-based international order. China must now convince other countries through its actions that it does not take a transactional and mercantilist approach, but rather an enlightened and inclusive view of its long term interests.
For example, when China joined the WTO in 2001, its merchandise trade accounted for only 4.0% of world trade. Since then China’s share has almost tripled, to 11.8%. This is why the trade arrangements and concessions that China negotiated when it joined the WTO are no longer politically wearable for other countries. It is in China’s own interest to prevent the international framework of trade from breaking down, and to implement timely changes that bring about greater reciprocity and parity with its trading partners, and that are more consistent with present day China’s more advanced state of development.
Similarly, in security, now that China is a major power with the second largest defence budget in the world, its words and actions are seen differently. To protect its territories and trade routes, it is natural that China would want to develop modern and capable armed forces, and aspire to become not just a continental power but also a maritime power. At the same time, to grow its international influence beyond hard power, military strength, China needs to wield this strength with restraint and legitimacy.
Frictions will arise between China and other countries from time to time. The overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea are one example. China should resolve these disputes peacefully, in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. It should do so through diplomacy and compromise rather than force or the threat of force, while giving weight to the core interests and rights of other countries. Then over time it will build its reputation as a responsible and benevolent power that need not be feared. Instead China will be respected as a power that can be relied on to support a stable and peaceful region. In the long term, this will allow China to continue to benefit from a conducive and friendly international environment, and enhance its influence and standing in the world.
The rest of the world too has to adjust to a larger role for China. Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen, and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening. China will have its own legitimate interests and ambitions, including to develop indigenously advanced technologies like infocomms and artificial intelligence. As a major stakeholder in the international system, China should be encouraged to play commensurate and constructive roles in supranational institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. If China cannot do so, it will create its own alternatives.
The United States, being the preeminent power, has the most difficult adjustment to make. But however difficult the task, it is well worth the US forging a new understanding that will integrate China’s aspirations within the current system of rules and norms. New international rules need to be made in many areas, including trade and intellectual property, cybersecurity and social media. China will expect a say in this process, because it sees the present rules as having been created in the past without its participation. This is an entirely reasonable expectation.
The bottomline is that the US and China need to work together, and with other countries too, to bring the global system up to date, and to not upend the system. To succeed in this, each must understand the other’s point of view, and reconcile each other’s interests.
Meanwhile, stresses and strains have built up between the two over multiple issues including cyber-espionage, 5G technology, freedom of navigation, human rights, and especially trade, where the two countries have reached an impasse.
If both sides treat their trade dispute purely on its own merits, I have no doubt their trade negotiators, who are highly competent, will be able to resolve it. But if either side uses trade rules to keep the other down, or one side comes to the conclusion that the other is trying to do this, then the dispute will not be resolved, and the consequences will be far graver than a loss of GDP. The broader bilateral relationship will be contaminated. Other areas will inevitably be affected, including investments, technology, and people-to-people relations. Every action taken by one side will be seen as a direct challenge to the other, and will elicit a counter-action. We will all be headed for a more divided and troubled world.
Hardening of attitudes in the US and China
Worryingly, this is starting to happen. Attitudes on both sides have been hardening. The US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents describe China as a “revisionist power” and America’s “strategic competitor”. The recent Presidential Executive Order on securing the information and communications technology and services supply chain, states that it is aimed at “foreign adversaries”. It stopped just short of naming any particular country, but made quite clear what actions the US intends to take.
There is a growing bipartisan consensus in the US: that China has taken advantage of the US for far too long; that China has overtaken, or will soon overtake, the US in areas of advanced technology, such as artificial intelligence and some aspects of military technology, through underhand means; that instead of opening up and becoming more like the US, China has regressed in terms of political openness, and hence represents a challenge to American values and leadership.
Americans now talk openly of containing China, and to do so soon before it is too late, the way they used to talk about the USSR and the Soviet bloc. This negative view of China has permeated the US establishment. It is not confined to the White House or the Administration, but is shared widely by Congress, the military, the media, academics and NGOs too. Those inclined to a more positive view of China have been marginalised.
Even US business sentiment towards China has soured. American businesses used to be the strongest supporters of China, because they benefited directly from China’s growth and economic opportunities. They had strongly advocated China’s accession to the WTO. When protectionist or nativist sentiments built up in the US, they were a balancing voice that counselled good relations with China.
Now, that goodwill has all but evaporated. US businesses feel let down that China has not adjusted its policies on trade and investments, and in fact systematically disadvantages foreign businesses operating in China, while Chinese businesses operate uninhibited in the US. They want greater access to the China market, and not just to use China for their global supply chains. This loss of goodwill on the part of an important constituency is a serious problem for China, which the Chinese have not fully appreciated or dealt with.
In China, views are hardening too. There are those who see the US as trying to thwart China’s legitimate ambitions – convinced that no matter what they do or concede on individual issues, the US will never be satisfied. They are alarmed by talk of a “clash of civilisations” between the US and China. They reject what they see as efforts by the US to impose its political system and political values on China.
This is coupled with a strong vein of nationalist fervour. Chinese television is rebroadcasting old movies of the Korean War, known in Chinese as 抗美援朝戰爭 which means the war to resist America and assist North Korea. There is even a “US trade war song” circulating on the internet, based on the theme music from a popular 1960s war movie about fighting the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War! Hardly anyone in China, whether in government, academia or the media, can be found who is prepared to speak up for a more positive and benign interpretation of the US’ intent.
The fundamental problem between the US and China is a mutual lack of strategic trust. This bodes ill for any compromise or peaceful accommodation. But to go down the present path would be a serious mistake on both sides. There is no strategic inevitability about a US-China face-off. But at the same time, if such a face-off does happen, it will be nothing like the Cold War.
First, there is no irreconcilable ideological divide between the US and China. China may be communist in political structure, but it has adopted market principles in many areas. The Soviets sought to overturn the world order. But China has benefited from, and by and large worked within, the framework of existing multilateral institutions. During the Cold War, the Communist bloc sought to export Communism to the world. But China today is not attempting to turn other countries Communist. Indeed, it is often criticised for being too willing to do business with countries and leaders regardless of their reputation or standing, citing non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Second, China has extensive economic and trade links with the rest of the world. It is a major node in the world economy, unlike the USSR, whose economic links outside the Soviet bloc were negligible. In fact, all of the US’ allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, as well as many of its friends and partners, including Singapore, have China as their largest trading partner. They all hope that the US and China will resolve their differences. They want to be friends with both: to nurture security and economic ties with the US, as they grow their business links with China. In a new Cold War, there can be no clear division between friend and foe. Nor is it possible to create NATO or Warsaw Pact equivalents with a hard line drawn through Asia, or drawn down the middle of the Pacific Ocean.
On the other hand, if there is indeed a conflict between the US and China, where will it end? The Cold War ended with the total collapse of the sclerotic planned economies of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, under the pressure of enormous defence spending. Even then, it took 40 years. It is highly improbable that the vigorous Chinese economy will collapse in the same way.
China cannot take down the US either. The US is still by far the strongest country in the world. Its economy remains the most innovative and powerful, and its military capabilities and spending far exceed China’s. Americans worry about China catching up with the US, but although China may be abreast or even ahead in some fields, it will be many years before China can equal the US. And contrary to what some people in China think, the US is not a declining power, nor is it withdrawing from the world. In fact, the US has made clear its intention to compete robustly, though in a different mode than before.
Even short of outright conflict, a prolonged period of tension and uncertainty would be extremely damaging. Many serious international problems like the Korean situation, nuclear non-proliferation, and climate change cannot be tackled without the full participation of the US and China, together with other countries. In economic terms the loss will be not just a percentage point or two of world GDP, but the huge benefits of globalised markets and production chains, and the sharing of knowledge and breakthroughs that enable all countries to progress faster together.
We should therefore do our utmost to avoid going down the path of conflict, and causing enmity on both sides that will last for generations. Of course, it is the duty of security and defence establishments to think the unthinkable, and plan for worst case scenarios. But it is the responsibility of political leaders to find solutions to head off these extreme outcomes.
This is hard, because leaders on both sides are facing powerful domestic pressures. In the US, the political mood is deeply divided and disgruntled. Large segments of American society have lost confidence in globalisation and multilateralism. According to a Pew survey last year, nearly half of all Americans have an unfavourable opinion of China. As the presidential elections approach, these attitudes will surely deepen, because neither the Republicans nor the Democrats will want to risk being accused of being ‘soft’ on China. Regardless whether President Trump is re-elected, or another Republican or Democrat wins, these sentiments will not go away.
China may not have US-style presidential elections, but their leaders face strong internal pressures too. In fact, the orientation of the Chinese leadership is primarily domestic. They know they have major issues to deal with at home. These include unevenly distributed growth, significant rural poverty, an aging population, and rising expectations for a better quality of life.
Both sides are sensitive about being perceived as weak. Out of political necessity, the US wants to show that it has come out ahead in any deal. On the other side, because of China’s long history with the West, its leaders cannot afford to appear to succumb to Western pressure to accept an “unequal” treaty. Just a few weeks ago, China commemorated the centennial of the May 4 movement. Not all of you may be familiar with it but it is an important date in Chinese history. In 1919, at the Versailles Peace Conference, a feeble China was forced to accept the decisions of the big powers. This caused Peking University students to demonstrate in protest, launching a nationalist movement to modernise and revive the country. This was a seminal moment in modern Chinese history.
This zero-sum dynamic makes it very hard to construct an agreement that is politically acceptable to both parties. But ultimately it is in the interests of both the US and China to reach such an accommodation, and to persuade their domestic publics to accept it. They both need to keep their relationship steady, so that both can focus on their respective pressing domestic priorities, and not be distracted by troubled relations with the other.
Multilateralism
What can other countries do collectively, to stem the growing hostility and instability? Small states like Singapore can do little to influence the big powers, but we are not entirely without agency.
There are many opportunities for smaller countries to work together to deepen economic cooperation, strengthen regional integration, and build up multilateral institutions. This way, we can strengthen our influence as a group, and advance a collective position on issues that matter to us, be they trade, security or technology.
Our multilateral institutions today are far from perfect. The WTO is one of the major institutions in the post-war global order, but now it is almost paralysed, and urgently needs reform. Multilateral global deals like the Uruguay Round are no longer practical, when agreement requires a full consensus among 164 member countries of hugely diverse interests and philosophies. Furthermore, the WTO was designed for an agricultural and manufacturing-based world economy, but the world has moved on to services and now increasingly digital and intellectual property, which need much more complicated rules.
The US has lost faith in the WTO. It often acts unilaterally, imposing tariffs and trade sanctions outside WTO rules. It prefers negotiating bilateral deals one on one against smaller countries in trials of strength. It gives more weight to the US’ direct benefits in the disputes at hand, than to its broader interests in upholding the multilateral system. This has caused concern to many of the US’ friends and allies.
Singapore cannot afford to adopt the same point of view. Being small, we are naturally disadvantaged in bilateral negotiations. We need to reform and strengthen multilateral institutions, not cripple or block them. More fundamentally, confining ourselves to a bilateral approach means forgoing win-win opportunities which come from countries working together with more partners. We need to build a broader regional and international architecture of cooperation. When groups of countries deepen their economic cooperation, they will enhance not just their shared prosperity but also their collective security. With more stake in one another’s success, they will have greater incentive to uphold a conducive and peaceful international order. This will benefit many countries big and small.
Thus, short of universal trade agreements, we should at least strive for regional or pluri-lateral arrangements. This may be a second best solution, but it is a practical way to incrementally build support for lower trade barriers and higher standards, which can then be adopted by other countries.
This was the rationale behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The US originally came on board the TPP because it saw the strategic benefits, although it ultimately withdrew. Fortunately, the remaining 11 members were able to preserve nearly all that had been negotiated, and so the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is now in force.
I am glad that more countries have expressed interest to join the CPTPP, including South Korea, Thailand and the UK. China is also watching the CPTPP carefully. They are not ready to join now, but I hope that they will seriously consider doing so sometime in the future. Similarly, I hope one day it will become politically possible for a US administration to rethink the US’ position, and recognise that it stands to gain, economically and strategically, from becoming a member of the partnership that it played a leading role in designing.
Meanwhile, countries in the Asia Pacific are working on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP has a different footprint from the CPTPP. It covers all the key countries on the western side of the Pacific, including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, and also importantly India, Australia and New Zealand. This inclusive configuration minimises the risk of the RCEP being misperceived as a bloc that excludes the US and its friends. With such a wide range of participants, RCEP standards are naturally less ambitious than the CPTPP’s, and the deal is also much harder to negotiate. Nonetheless, I hope the participants can take the final step to complete the RCEP by this year, or if not, as soon as the election schedules of the key players allow.
Of course, regional cooperation goes beyond trade. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has provided ten very different countries an effective platform for dialogue and cooperation. ASEAN has deepened ties and kept the peace amongst its members. It has become an effective regional partner of other countries, and enabled its members to project a stronger external presence as a group.
ASEAN works on the basis of consensus. It makes more progress in some areas than others, because ASEAN members are not immune to the strategic forces which pull us in different directions. This is the hard reality of cooperation in a region exposed to multiple external influences. Despite its limitations, ASEAN has contributed much to the well-being of its members and the security of the region, and ASEAN’s partners recognise the value of ASEAN Centrality.
Amid the geopolitical shifts, new concepts and platforms for regional cooperation have emerged, notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Singapore supports the BRI. We see it as a constructive mechanism for China to be positively engaged with the region and beyond. That is why we are active participants. For example, we work with the World Bank to promote financial and infrastructure connectivity, and we provide supporting professional and legal services to BRI countries. We are also partnering China to develop the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, which connects Western China to Southeast Asia under the China-Singapore (Chongqing) Connectivity Initiative (CCI-ILSTC).
Of course the substance of the BRI, and the way in which the BRI is implemented, are very important. The specific projects must be economically sound and commercially viable, and must bring long term benefits to its partners. This has not always been the case; some BRI projects have run into significant problems. Overall, the BRI must be open and inclusive, and must not turn the region into a closed bloc centred on a single major economy. As Asian countries deepen their links with China, they also need to grow their ties with the US, Europe, Japan and others. In other words, the BRI should help China to integrate with the world. The end result should be to strengthen globalisation, and not to divide the world into rival spheres of influence.
I believe China appreciates this. At the recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, Chinese leaders stated clearly that the BRI would be “open, green and clean”. China’s Finance Minister set out debt sustainability requirements for Belt and Road projects, which the IMF has welcomed. In the nature of such reassurances, the test will be how these statements of intent are implemented in practice, but these are steps in the right direction.
Meanwhile, other initiatives have been proposed for regional cooperation. For example, several countries have proposed various concepts of “Indo-Pacific cooperation”. These ideas are less fully elaborated or implemented than the BRI, but Singapore’s attitude towards them is consistent. We support regional cooperation initiatives which are open and inclusive platforms for countries to cooperate constructively, and deepen regional integration. These initiatives should strengthen existing cooperation arrangements centred on ASEAN. They should not undermine them, create rival blocs, deepen fault lines or force countries to take sides. They should help bring countries together, rather than split them apart.
Conclusion
US-China relations will define the tenor of international relations for years to come. It is natural that the two powers will vie for power and influence, but competition should not inevitably lead to conflict. We hope the US and China find a constructive way forward, competing certainly, but at the same time cooperating on major issues of mutual interest.
Some people argue that compromise is not possible or perhaps not even desirable, because the US and China hold such different values. Indeed, one US official recently defined the clash with China as “a fight with a really different civilisation and a different ideology”. Others observe that the US is a young country that wants everyone to be like them, while China is an old country that believes no one else can be like them.
To expect every country to adopt the same cultural values and political system is neither reasonable nor realistic. In fact, humankind’s diversity is its strength. There is much we can learn from one another, from the differences in our values, perspectives, systems, and policies. The story of humankind’s progress has been one of exchange of ideas, and continuous learning and adaptation.
Henry Kissinger said last year that “we are in a very, very grave period for the world”. No one can predict which way events will develop. At different times in the last two centuries, Southeast Asia has seen rivalry between great powers. It has experienced destruction and suffering from war and occupation. It has been divided into opposing camps. It has seen how isolation from the world economy led to stagnation and sometimes conflict. At other times, it has benefited from international cooperation that created an open, stable environment where countries could prosper in peace.
On a long view, we cannot rule out any of these eventualities. But in our own generation, we must work together to maximise the chances that countries will have the wisdom and courage to make the right choices, opt for openness and integration, peace and cooperation, and so preserve and expand the progress which we have made together.
Thank you very much.
國際戰略研究所所長約翰.奇普曼博士閣下
各位閣下
各位嘉賓，女士們、先生們
大家晚上好！
歡迎各位來到新加坡並出席第 18 屆香格里拉對話會。
新加坡和東南亞的視角
世界正處於一個轉折點。全球化受到多方的抨擊，美國和中國的關係日益緊張。新加坡和許多其他國家一樣，非常擔心這樣的趨勢。我們既不知道形勢會如何發展，也不曉得世界各國是否能夠攜手開闢新的出路，一同維護世界和平與繁榮。
我們是否能從東南亞歷史中得到啟示，在求取進步的道路上避開過去的動亂與災難？今年是新加坡開埠 200 週年。200 年前，英國人史丹福.萊佛士登陸新加坡，並在這裡設立了貿易站。當時，荷蘭人已經對東印度群島進行殖民統治。比起其他歐洲國家，英國人到東南亞尋求發展相對較晚。萊佛士當時是明古連（位於蘇門答臘西岸）副總督。 他意識到這個地區的巨大貿易潛力，因此決定在馬六甲海峽沿岸尋找新的地點，為英國東印度公司設立貿易站。於是，他選擇了新加坡，而這也改變了我們的命運。
荷蘭人強烈抗議萊佛士的舉動，但徒勞無功。為了保護其壟斷地位，荷蘭人禁止其它國家的船隻在荷蘭管轄的港口運行，或向這些船隻徵收昂貴的關稅。萊佛士採取了不同的管理方式。他在新加坡設立了自由貿易港。貿易和人口迅速增長，顯示了英國所採取的較開放貿易政策，更具成效。
在之後的一個世紀，東南亞由英國、荷蘭、西班牙和法國分治，美國之後也在東南亞進行殖民統治。殖民強國之間的競爭非常激烈，但沒有一個國家能在整個區域中占主導地位。
到了二十世紀，列強仍在東南亞為各自的利益展開爭奪。1941年，日本帝國侵略了法屬中南半島。美國向日本進行反擊，禁止向日本出口石油。 這引爆了太平洋戰爭。日本轟炸美國珍珠港當天，也進攻馬來亞和新加坡。新加坡被日本佔領，在長達三年零八個月的日據時期裡，人民飽受壓迫，在恐懼中度過了苦難歲月。
到了冷戰時期，東南亞再次成為戰爭前線。這個區域被劃分成共產主義與非共產主義國家。共產主義和非共產主義之間的代理戰爭也隨後在越南展開。同時，中國在東南亞各地，包括馬來亞和新加坡等非共產主義國家，支持當地共產黨的革命行動，提倡武裝起義。
這局勢促使了五個非共產主義國家，即印度尼西亞、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡和泰國，在 1967 年成立亞細安（中國稱“東盟”）。這是個非凡的成就，也體現了五國領導人的政治家風範。當時，這五個國家之間仍存有不少記憶猶新的糾紛與衝突，傷痕也未完全癒合。然而，它們願意冰釋前嫌、放下矛盾，朝亞細安共同體的方向邁進，展開了對話與合作，並建立友誼。它們一起融入世界經濟，與先進國家發展貿易關係，經濟也隨著繁榮起來。至於位處中南半島的共產主義國家，它們受到持續戰亂和計劃經濟的牽制，發展步伐較為緩慢。
冷戰結束後，美國成為了當時世界唯一的超級強國，東南亞也進入新的發展階段。隨著中南半島戰爭的結束，共產主義國家也逐漸對外開放。 越南之前入侵柬埔寨，因此對鄰近非共產國家的安全構成嚴重威脅。但最後，越南、老撾、柬埔寨和緬甸還是加入了亞細安。大家化干戈為玉帛，共同謀求發展。
接下來數十年裡，穩定的外部環境為東南亞的發展提供了良好條件。另一方面，美國在亞太地區扮演了主導角色，並在維持區域的穩定和安全方面發揮了作用。隨著國際貿易迅速擴張，各國紛紛消除貿易壁壘，而引領者往往是美國。 亞細安各國也通過出口型增長和外來投資取得了蓬勃的發展。世界貿易組織和《聯合國海洋法公約》（United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea，簡稱 UNCLOS）等國際框架制定規則、處理糾紛、平衡相爭利益以及促進大小國家之間的合作。起初，中國的經濟影響力不大。不過，隨著中國的經濟開始騰飛，它便逐漸成為亞細安國家重要的經濟夥伴，以及區域事務的重要參與者。
中美關係
我重述這段歷史，是為了表明大國博弈對東南亞來說並不陌生，並將當下的戰略局勢和歷史背景聯繫起來。中美關係是現今世界最重要的雙邊關係，兩國如何處理彼此的緊張關係和摩擦將決定整個國際 環境的未來走向。
這幾十年來，中美關係已發生了顯著的改變。中國自四十年前改革開放以來，已出現巨大變化。今天，中國的實際人均國內生產總值已經增加了 25 倍以上。與此同時，中國也晉升為世界第二大經濟體。
從各方面來看，中國的經濟增長對中國本身，乃至全世界，都帶來巨大好處。中國在很大的程度上已將其中央計劃經濟轉變為中等收入及市場驅動型經濟，但離完全的市場經濟還有一段距離。此外，中國也成功讓超過 8 億 5000 萬中國人脫貧，這樣的成就在人類歷史上是前所未有的。
中國的發展與成功也讓全世界受惠。中國已成為一個龐大的生產和製造基地，為全世界降低了製造成本。中國最初生產的是勞動密集型的產品，現在則逐漸轉向生產高價值和技術密集的產品。中國也是一個龐大的市場，因為中國從世界各地進口各種產品，包括商品、電子零件、客機和美酒等。全世界數十億消費者購買各種中國製造的商品，包括芭比娃娃、籃球、無人機和智能手機，這些商品往往也用到其他國家生產的零件和科技。
相反，假設中國四十年前沒有進行改革開放、經濟沒有增長，中國可能將面對諸多國內問題，其中還可能包括繼續輸出武裝革命。這將在許多方面波及國際社會。 中國成千上萬的人民如果意識到自己的國家因為沒能跟上全球化的發展而落後於其他國家，必定會感到憤憤不平。 30 年前，中國還是一個貧困國家，鄧小平先生出訪美國時，時任美國總統吉米·卡特就問他，是否會放寬移民政策，讓更多中國人移民。鄧小平先生的回覆是：“總統先生，您願意接收多少中國人呢？一千萬、兩千萬、 還是三千萬名中國人？”
所幸，中國的成功讓世界避開了這個災難性的結果。中國的增長改變了戰略平衡，也轉移了世界的經濟重心，而這種改變還會持續下去。
中國和其他國家都必須做出調整，適應新局勢。中國必須意識到它的成功開創了全新的世界格局，不能期望其他國家繼續以扶助弱小國家的方式相待。儘管中國可能還需要幾十年才能成為一個真正的發達先進國家，卻不能到了幾十年後才肩負起更大的國際責任。
中國從國際體系獲益良多，因此，維護現有體系，使其順利運作，造福國際社會，在相當的程度上也符合它自身的利益。中國領導人已站出來強烈表達了對全球化和以規則為基礎的國際秩序的支持。現在，它必須通過行動來說服國際社會，在處理雙邊關係時，中國不會採取重商主義的做法，只把合作看成交易，而是以開明和包容的態度看待其長遠利益。
例如，18 年前，中國剛加入世貿組織時，其商品貿易還不到全球貿易的 4%。 時移世易，中國如今的商品貿易已經提升兩倍，佔全球11.8%。因此，從政治角度來說，其他國家已無法接受中國繼續享有在加入世貿組織時所獲得的貿易安排和優惠措施。維護國際貿易架構，並對現有的安排作出及時調整，以增進中國和貿易伙伴之間的互惠與平等關係，避免國際貿易體系崩潰瓦解，這些都符合中國的利益，也與它今時今日較為發達的狀態相稱。
同樣的，在國際安全方面，中國既已躋身強國之列，國防預算位列世界第二，其言行就會受到國際社會的關注。為了捍衛領土和貿易路線，中國自然會尋求發展先進和強大的軍事實力，不僅要成為陸地強國，也有意建設海洋強國，這些都是可以理解的。與此同時，中國仍須以剋制的方式展現實力，並按照國際規範行事，以符合自身的利益。
中國與其他國家之間不時會發生糾紛和摩擦。南中國海主權聲索相互重疊就是一例。中國應該按照國際法，包括聯合國海洋法公約和平解決這些爭端，並通過外交途徑達成妥協，而不是訴諸武力或武力威脅，同時正視其它國家的核心利益和權利。久而久之，中國將被視為負責任的仁慈大國， 其他國家不但無需感到畏懼，也會因為仰賴它維護本區域穩定與和平而更尊重中國。長遠來看，這將讓中國在有利和友善的國際環境中持續發展，並提高中國在世界的影響力和地位。
另一方面，各國也必須適應一個更具影響力的中國。大家必須接受中國會繼續壯大的事實，並且瞭解阻止中國不斷強大是不可能的事，更非明智之舉。和其他國家一樣，中國也擁有合理的利益和期望，包括開發本土的高端科技，如資訊通信和人工智能。作為國際體系的主要利益相關者，中國必須能在國際機構如國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行和世界貿易組織等，扮演恰如其分和具建設性的角色，否則它會另起爐灶。
作為世界頭號強國，美國所必須做的調整最為艱難。無論這項工作有多艱難，如果美國能取得新共識，讓中國的期望融入現有的規則和規範體制，這將為兩國帶來好處。我們必須為多個領域擬定新規則，包括貿易、知識產權、網絡安全和社交媒體。中國會希望對這些改變擁有話語權，因為現有的規則是以前擬定的，中國當時沒有參與。這是個合理的要求。
最重要的是，美國和中國必須和其他國家合作，共同提升而不是顛覆國際體系。要實現這點，中美兩國都必須從對方的角度看待問題，才能更清楚瞭解彼此應如何協調各自的利益。
可是，現在的情況是，中美關係因為好幾個課題而變得更緊張，包括網上間諜活動、第五代網絡（5G）科技、自由航行權、人權和已經導致兩國陷入僵局的貿易課題。
如果雙方把爭端純粹視為貿易問題來處理，我相信它們的貿易談判代表們將能夠解決問題。但是，如果某方想利用貿易規則來打壓對方，或認為對方正試圖這麼做，那麼這場糾紛將無法化解，而其後果將遠比國內生產總值的損失來得慘重。中美兩國的廣泛關係將受到嚴重的打擊，其他方面如投資、科技以及兩國人民之間的關係也會受到影響。中美兩國的一舉一動都可能被對方視為挑釁，並促使對方做出反擊。如此一來，世界將陷入一個更為分化和不安的局面。
美國和中國態度更為強硬
令人擔憂的是，雙方的態度確實變得更加強硬。美國近期發佈的《戰略安全報告》和《國防戰略摘要》兩份報告，形容中國為“戰略競爭對手”與“修正主義大國”。美國總統特朗普近日簽署的《確保信息通信技術與服務供應鏈安全》行政命令，更表明是針對“外國對手”。這項行政命令雖然沒有具體點出任何國家，但已清楚顯示美國要採取什麼行動。
美國共和黨和民主黨正逐漸達成共識，認為美國長久以來被中國利用；並指責中國通過不正當的手段，在某些先進科技領域如人工智能和部分的國防科技方面迎頭趕上，甚至超越美國；以及中國不但沒有效仿美國，轉向政治開放，反而背道而馳，因此對美國所主導的價值觀和其領導地位造成威脅。
美國人如今公開談論如何遏制中國崛起，如同他們當年對蘇聯的全方位遏制措施，並希望儘早行動、以免為時太晚。這種對中國的負面看法已經滲透美國的體制。除了特朗普政府，還包括美國國會、軍事、媒體、學者、非政府機構等。較折中的觀點已被邊緣化了。
就連美國企業對中國的看法也惡化了。以往，美國企業是中國最堅定的支持者，因為中國的經濟增長所帶來的經濟機遇讓它們直接受益。 它們大力支持中國加入世界貿易組織。當保護主義或本土意識早在美國抬頭時，它們願意為中國說公道話，在提倡中美保持良好關係方面起到正面作用。
但如今，美國企業對中國持有的善意都幾乎不復存在。美國企業覺得中國辜負了它們的期望，不但沒有調整其經濟和投資政策，甚至還系統性地實施對在華營業的美國和外國企業不利的措施，但中國企業卻能在美國自由運作。美國企業要求中方給予它們更大的市場準入權，而不僅是將中國當作全球供應鏈的一部分。許多歐洲企業也有同感。外企作為重要的支持者，對中國已不存善意對中國而言是個嚴重的問題，中方還未真正意識到這點，或加以應對。
另外，中國人對美方的態度也變得更強硬。有些人認為美國正試圖阻撓中國成為世界強國的雄心抱負。他們相信，無論中國做什麼，或是在各別課題上做出讓步，美國永遠都不會滿意。他們對中美“文明衝突”的論述感到擔憂，也不接受任何他們視為是美國試圖將其政治體制和價值觀強加於中國的做法。
與此同時，中國國內也掀起了一股激烈的民族主義思潮。中國電視臺正重播抗美援朝戰爭的舊片。最近網絡上也流傳一首名為“貿易戰”的歌曲，其音樂取自上世紀 60 年代抗日戰爭影片的主題曲。中國方面，無論是政府官員、智囊團或媒體，幾乎沒有人願意站出來以一種更正面、更溫和的方式來解讀美國的意圖。
中美之間基本的問題是雙方缺乏戰略互信，而這不利於雙方作出任何讓步或和解。如果讓這種情形持續下去，對中美雙方來說都是嚴重的錯誤。中美對峙未必一定發生。不過萬一真的發生，後果將和冷戰完全不同。
首先，中美之間不存在無法化解的根本意識形態分歧 。雖然中國就政治體制而言是個共產主義國家，但它在很多方面卻是採納資本市場原則。冷戰時期，蘇聯企圖顛覆世界秩序。但中國大致上遵循由美國主導、以現有多邊機構組成的規則框架，並從中受惠。冷戰時期，共產集團試圖將共產主義輸出到世界各地。但今天的中國並沒有試圖把其他國家變成共產國家，事實上，中國經常被指過於樂意和一些國家和領袖進行貿易往來，不論他們的名聲和地位如何。中國所給予的理由是它不干涉其他國家的內政。
第二，中國與世界各國的經貿聯繫緊密，是世界經濟一大樞紐。蘇聯對外則採取封閉政策，與蘇聯集團以外的經濟聯繫微乎其微。 事實上，美國在亞洲的盟友，包括日本、韓國、菲律賓、泰國和澳大利亞，以及包括新加坡在內的許多區域夥伴國，它們的最大貿易伙伴國都是中國。這些國家都希望美國和中國能夠化解彼此之間的分歧，同時也希望能繼續和兩國維持友好關係。這些國家在擴大它們和中國的貿易往來時，也努力加強與美國的安全與經貿關係。如果爆發“新冷戰”，朋友與敵人之間的界限將非常模糊。要在亞洲成立相等於北約還是華沙條約組織的軍事同盟，把亞洲或是太平洋硬生生分成兩半，那是不可能的事。
如果中美兩國真的發生衝突，後果會是如何呢？冷戰結束時，蘇聯以及華沙條約組織成員國僵化的計劃經濟不堪龐大的國防開銷所帶來的壓力，而徹底崩潰。即便如此，整個過程也歷時 40 年。我們很難想象蓬勃的中國經濟會同樣崩潰。
另一方面，中國也無法輕易扳倒美國。到目前為止，美國仍然是世界第一強國，它的經濟是世界上最具創新力和最強大的，其軍事力量和開支也遠遠超過中國。美國人擔心中國會趕上美國，但儘管中國在一些領域可能領先美國， 中國仍需要很長的時間，才能和美國分庭抗禮。美國也絕非如一些中國人所說的正走向沒落，也沒有自我封閉。相反，美國很清楚地表明會以不同的方式，全力以赴與其他國家競爭。
中美關係若持續緊張和不明朗，即便最後沒有發生嚴重衝突，也將對全球帶來巨大破壞。很多重要的課題如朝鮮半島局勢，核不擴散和氣候變化等問題，若沒有中美兩國和其他國家的全面參與，將難以解決。經濟上的損失不只是世界生產總值的一到兩個百分點，而是失去全球一體化市場和生產鏈，以及分享知識和各方面所取得的突破的利益。這些發展都讓各國發展更加迅速。
&因此， 我們必須盡最大的能力避免衝突的發生，以免雙方產生長久難以根除的敵意。 當然，雙方的安全機構和國防部門的職責是考慮所有不可想象的情況，包括最壞的情況，做好準備。不過，政治領袖有責任找出解決方案，避免衝突惡化而導致災難性的後果。
這相當不容易，因為雙方領導都面對不少國內壓力。美國方面，政治氛圍嚴重分歧，不滿情緒持續上升。美國社會大部分已對全球化和多邊主義失去信心。皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）去年的調查發現，將近一半的美國人對中國的印象並不好。隨著美國大選的腳步逼近，美國民眾看待中國的態度肯定會更強烈，因為無論是共和黨或是民主黨候選人，都不願意被指對中國的態度有所軟化。不論特朗普總統能否連任，或共和黨和民主黨兩黨之間鹿死誰手，美國民眾這樣的情緒都難以改變。
中國雖然沒有美國式的總統選舉，不過中國領導所面對的內部壓力也不少。中方領導注重國情，深刻了解需要著手解決重大國內課題，包括經濟增長分配不均、農村貧困問題、人口老化以及民眾對於生活品質的要求不斷提升。
中美雙方領導對於被視為“軟弱”都非常敏感。美國出於政治需求，必須讓自己在任何談判中都顯得略勝一籌。另一方面，中國由於和西方國家有著相關的歷史包袱，其領導人不能被視為向西方屈服，被迫接受新的不平等條約。就在幾周前，中國舉辦了五四運動的百年紀念活動。1919 年，當時羸弱的中國被迫接受其他大國在凡爾賽和平會議提出的條件。這促使北京大學學生髮起街頭示威和抗議，連帶發起了民族主義運動，以實現國家的現代化，從而復興中國。這是中國現代歷史上開創性的時刻。
這樣的零和思維導致中美雙方難以達成政治協議。然而，歸根究底，中國和美國達成某種協議是符合雙方利益的做法，因此兩國都必須說服自己的人民接受所達成的協議。中美也必須保持雙邊關係的穩定，以便專注於國內事務，無需為處理雙邊關係而分心。
多邊主義
其他國家要如何共同遏制愈加強烈的敵意，以及愈漸不穩定的局勢？諸如新加坡這般的小國能力有限，無法影響大國的決策，但這並不意味著我們完全任人支配。
中小型國家有許多機會合作，深化經濟合作關係、推進區域一體化，並建立多邊機構。這樣一來，小國就可以聯合起來，擴大其影響力，在關乎自身的課題上採取共同的立場，包括貿易、安全或科技等方面。
誠然，現今的多邊機構仍有許多有待改進的空間。世貿組織雖然是國際系統二戰後創建的重要國際機構之一，現在卻近乎癱瘓，急需改革。世貿組織成員國之間的利益和理念天差地別，但任何協議卻需要所有 164 個成員國完全達成共識，這使得像烏拉圭回合談判這等全球多邊貿易協定變得不切實際。更何況，世貿組織是為以農業和製造業為基礎的全球經濟而設計的，但現在的全球局勢卻已不同，主要以服務業為主，數碼科技和知識產權也逐漸變得更重要。這意味著我們需要為這些產業制定更復雜的規則。
美國對世貿組織已經失去信心。美國現在經常在世貿組織規則之外，單方面徵收關稅和實施貿易制裁。美國也偏向於選擇雙邊貿易協定，與比它小的國家進行一對一的談判。相較於維護多邊體制的廣泛利益，這個做法更能讓美國從糾紛中直接獲利。這種美國優先的做法讓友國十分擔憂。
新加坡不能持有相同的觀點。身為小國，新加坡在雙邊談判中自然處於較不利的地位。我們需要改革並強化多邊體系，而不是削弱或阻礙其發展。更重要的是，如果我們把國與國之間的合作侷限在雙邊合作上，將意味著我們無法享有多邊合作所帶來的雙贏機會。此外，我們也需要建立更廣泛的區域甚至是國際合作架構。多個國家共同加深經濟合作，不僅能夠促進彼此的繁榮，還能加強集體安全。這是因為它們對彼此的成功存在利害關係，使它們更有推動力維護有利和平的國際秩序。這樣一來，許多國家無論大小，都能從中受惠。
因此，如果不能推進全球多邊貿易協議，我們至少必須繼續推進區域或諸邊貿易協議。這或許不是最理想的解決方案，但這是務實的做法，讓各國能逐步減少貿易壁壘和為協議設定更高的標準，供其他國家採用。
這就是當初我們啟動“跨太平洋夥伴關係協定”（簡稱 TPP）的原因。美國原先參與 TPP 談判，因為它意識到其中的戰略效益，但最終還是退出了。所幸，餘下的 11 個成員國繼續磋商，並最終保留大部分的內容，形成了目前已生效的“跨太平洋夥伴全面進展協定”（簡稱 CPTPP）。
好幾個國家，包括韓國、泰國和英國都表示有意加入 CPTPP，這讓我感到欣慰。中國也正密切關注 CPTPP 的發展。雖然中國目前沒有加入的打算，我希望中國有一天會認真考慮加入 CPTPP。同樣的，我也希望有朝一日，美國的政治環境能允許美國政府重新考慮美國的立場，並意識到加入 CPTPP 對美國在經濟和戰略上都有好處。畢竟美國也曾在 TPP（CPTPP 的前身）的籌劃過程中扮演重要的角色。
亞太地區國家目前正努力完成區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定（簡稱 RCEP）的談判。與 CPTPP 不同，RCEP 包括西太平洋區域的主要國家，包括東北亞與東南亞國家，更重要的是，它也納入了印度，澳大利亞和新西蘭。這樣的安排將減低 RCEP 被誤解為是一個排擠美國和其合作伙伴的集團的風險。由於 RCEP 成員國之間的差異較大，其所設定的目標自然比 CPTPP 低，在磋商的過程中也較難取得共識。儘管如此，我仍希望成員國可以作最後衝刺，在今年內完成 RCEP 的談判，或者是當主要成員的國內政治局勢允許的時候。
當然，區域合作不僅限於貿易合作。例如，東南亞國家所成立的亞細安就為其十個國情各異的成員國提供了有效的交流與合作平臺，加深它們之間的關係，並促進各方和平共處。亞細安已經成為其他國家有效的合作伙伴。作為一個群體，它也讓成員國施展更大的影響力。
亞細安秉持以共識定決策的原則。它在一些事務上進展順利，另一些則停滯不前，這是因為亞細安成員國面對了來自各方的戰略勢力的壓力。這是我們需要認清的現實，那就是在區域展開合作，就必須面對各種外部的影響。儘管亞細安存在侷限，亞細安還是為成員國的福祉和本區域的安全貢獻良多，而亞細安的夥伴國也肯定了“亞細安中心論”（ASEAN centrality）的價值。
隨著地緣政治的變化，促成區域合作的新概念和平臺也應運而生，最顯著的是中國的“一帶一路”倡議。新加坡支持“一帶一路”，視之為中國積極參與區域和區域以外活動的具有建設性的機制，因此我們也是“一帶一路”的積極參與者。例如，我們與世界銀行合作，推廣金融和基礎建設的互聯互通，同時也為“一帶一路”參與國提供專業和法律服務。新加坡也同中國合作，發展中新（重慶）戰略性互聯互通示範項目旗下的“國際陸海貿易新通道”，將中國西部與東南亞連接起來。
當然，“一帶一路”倡議的實質內容和落實的方式也很重要。個別項目必須具有商業價值並符合經濟效益，同時為合作伙伴帶來長期利益。可是，並非每個項目都如此順利，有些項目工程可謂困難重重。整體而言，“一帶一路”必須保持開放和具包容性，不能把整個區域變成一個封閉的聯盟，只以一個單一主要經濟體為中心。亞洲國家在與中國深化聯繫的同時，也需要與美國、歐洲、日本和其它國家發展友好關係。換言之，“一帶一路”應該幫助中國融入世界。最終的成果必須是加強全球化，而不是導致各方勢力處於對立狀態。
我相信中國意識到這點。不久前，中國領導人在北京舉行的第二屆“一帶一路”國際合作高峰論壇上明確表示，“一帶一路”將堅持“開放、綠色、廉潔”的理念。財政部長劉昆也表示，中國將成立“一帶一路”債務可持續性分析框架，以防範債務風險，這受到國際貨幣基金組織的歡迎。因此，接下來的考驗在於如何實踐這些承諾。不過，肯定的是， 他們正朝正確的方向邁進。
與此同時，有些國家也提出了促進區域合作的其它項目。例如，一些國家就提出各種概念來加強印度 – 太平洋區域合作。比起“一帶一路”倡議，這些項目或許還缺少細節，或是還未全面推行，但是新加坡的態度是一以貫之的。我們支持任何開放、具包容性的區域合作項目，因為它們是促進各國有效合作、加深區域一體化的平臺。不過，這些項目必須加強而不是破壞以亞細安為中心的現有安排，不應該造成陣營對立、加深矛盾或迫使各國選邊站。它們應該團結而不是分化世界。
總結
中美關係將決定國際關係未來的發展。世界兩大強國展開權力、勢力之爭是很自然的，但競爭不該演變成衝突。我們希望中美兩國能找到具建設性的合作模式，在競爭的同時，也在各個重要課題上展開合作，共創雙贏。
基於中美兩國截然不同的價值觀，有些人認為兩國之間不可能、甚至不應該達成協議。一名美國官員最近就把中美博弈形容為“迥然不同的文明和意識形態之間的鬥爭”。同時，也有人認為美國是個希望被人人效仿的年輕國家；反之、中國則是個自認無法被模仿的古老國家。
想要世界各國都採納同樣的文化價值觀和政治體系不單是強人所難、更是不切實際。事實上，人類的多樣性就是它的力量。我們可以從價值觀、觀點、制度和政策的差異中互相學習。人類能不斷進步，就仰賴思想的交流，以及不斷地學習和適應。
美國前國務卿基辛格去年曾表示，世界正處於一個非常非常嚴峻的時期。沒有人能夠預測事態的發展。上兩個世紀，東南亞在不同時期見證了大國之間的抗爭。它經歷了戰火的蹂躪，和被他人佔領所帶來的破壞和苦難，並被分成對立的陣營。它也親眼見證，一個國家或區域如果與世界經濟隔絕，都將停滯不前，有時候還會引發衝突。另一些時候，它又受益於國際合作，這種合作創造了一個開放、穩定的環境，讓各國能夠在和平中繁榮昌盛。
長遠來說，我們不能排除任何可能發生的情況。不過，我們這一代必須共同努力，才能在最大限度上確保每個國家都會以睿智和勇氣作出正確的抉擇，並支持經濟開放和一體化，同時保存以及擴大我們共同取得的進展。
謝謝
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