追逐難以企及的10% 教育頭條網

追逐難以企及的10%

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感謝思維導圖作者

Mayof, 女，大三, catti三級備考中, 比較文學考研備考中

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Reaching for the elusive 10%

追逐難以企及的10%

英文部分選自經濟學人Finance and economics版塊

European banks

歐洲銀行

Reaching for the elusive 10%

追逐難以企及的10%

The continent’s lenders try to claw their way back to financial respectability. Good luck

歐洲銀行力爭重返金融第一方陣，祝好！

It’s not all bad. In 2008 Lloyds, a large British bank, took over HBOS, a rival that was being sucked beneath the rising waters of the global financial crisis. HBOS nearly dragged Lloyds under with it; £20.3bn (then about $30bn) of public money was needed to keep the combined group afloat. But these days Lloyds is doing all right.

歐洲的銀行業倒也並非陰霾遍佈。2008年，英國一家大型銀行勞埃德兼併了其競爭對手蘇格蘭哈里法克斯銀行(HBOS)。當時HBOS正深陷金融風暴的漩渦之中，這一合併案差點也將勞埃德銀行拖入深淵。勞埃德需要出資203億英鎊(當時約合300億美元)才能維持兼併後的公司運營週轉。但如今，勞埃德銀行已經走出陰影，業績表現出色。

Under António Horta-Osório, its chief executive since 2011, Lloyds has ditched almost all its foreign operations, narrowed its product range and (like many other banks) poured money into digitisation. The state sold its last shares in 2017. Last year the bank’s return on tangible equity (ROTE), a measure of profitability, was a decent 11.7%. This year Mr Horta-Osório is aiming for 14-15%, Brexit notwithstanding.

自2011年António Horta-Osório擔任首席執行官以來，勞埃德銀行幾乎砍掉了所有的海外業務，縮小了產品覆蓋範圍，並(和許多銀行一樣)斥巨資進行數字化改革。2017年英國政府出售了其持有的最後一批勞埃德股份。去年，該銀行的有形股本回報率（一項盈利指標，簡寫ROTE）達到了可觀的11.7%。今年，儘管英國脫歐風雨飄搖，Horta-Osório先生仍將這一指標的目標值提升到了14%-15%。

Some other European banks also have good stories to tell. The Netherlands’ ING is also a refurbished state-aid case. Its online German bank, ING-DiBa, claims to return over 20%. Spain’s Santander, the euro area’s biggest bank by market capitalisation, sailed through its homeland’s financial storm without a single loss-making quarter. On April 3rd it set out plans to lift its rote from 11.7% last year to 13-15% by cutting costs and exploiting digitisation. Nordic banks make bonny returns—although both Danske Bank and Swedbank, beset by money-laundering scandals, have sacked their chief executives recently.

歐洲其他一些銀行也有喜訊傳出。荷蘭國際集團ING，作為在國家援助下重獲新生的另一代表，其在德國設立的網絡銀行ING-DiBa宣佈收益率超過20%。而歐元區市值最大的銀行，西班牙桑坦德銀行(Santander)安然渡過了其國內的金融風暴，無一季度虧損。4月3日，桑坦德計劃通過削減成本和探索數字化轉型，將有形股本回報率從去年的11.7%提高到13%-15%。北歐地區的銀行們也都獲利頗豐，儘管深陷洗錢醜聞困擾的丹斯克銀行(DanskeBank)和瑞典銀行(Swedbank)最近相繼解僱了各自的首席執行官。

But the overall picture is glum. In a quarterly survey published on March 29th, the European Banking Authority (eba), a supervisor, found that in the last three months of 2018 the weighted average return on equity (roe) of 190 European Union banks was 6.5%. (roe is a little lower than rote because goodwill and other intangible assets are deducted from the denominator of the latter.) Over the past four years the average roe in the eba’s report has fluctuated between 3.3% and 7.3% (see chart).

然而歐洲銀行業總體形勢並不樂觀，在3月29日發佈的季度評估報告中，歐洲銀行管理局（European Banking Authority，後文簡稱EBA ）披露，190家歐盟銀行去年（2018）第四季度的加權平均淨資產收益率(ROE)為6.5%(由於ROTE計算時在分母中扣除信譽和其他無形資產，ROE會比ROTE略低)。在過去的四年裡，EBA報告中記錄的平均淨資產收益率一直在3.3%到7.3%之間波動(見圖表)。

That is not enough to keep shareholders happy. They want 10% or so. At a recent conference hosted by Morgan Stanley, 70% of attendees estimated European banks’ cost of equity (coe)—the minimum roe shareholders consider acceptable—to be between 9% and 11%. Twice a year the eba also asks banks to estimate their coes. Last December two-thirds put their benchmarks at 8-10% and another one-sixth said 10-12%. Only 55% said that they were earning more than their coe.

這讓原本期望ROE能夠達到10%上下的股東們大失所望。在摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）最近主辦的一次會議上，70%的參會者預估歐洲銀行的權益資本成本(COE，即公司股東可接受的最低淨資產收益率)應在9%到11%之間。EBA也要求銀行自己每年進行兩次權益資本成本估算。去年12月，三分之二的銀行將COE基準定在8-10%，另有六分之一定在10-12%。只有55%的銀行表示其收益率高於其權益資本成本。

That 6.5% is also well below the returns enjoyed by investors on the other side of the Atlantic. Among America’s biggest banks, only Citigroup reported an roe of below 10% last year, and, at 9.4%, not by much. us Bancorp, the seventh-biggest by assets, weighed in with 15.4%. The Europeans underperform on whatever measure you care to choose—for example, rote or return on assets (roa), which strips out the effect of gearing (the share of assets funded by equity). Figures supplied by Stuart Graham of Autonomous Research indicate that the average roa of nine big American banks was double that of 24 leading European lenders.

6.5%的ROE也遠低於大西洋彼岸的投資者獲得的收益。在美國最大的幾家銀行中，只有花旗集團去年的淨資產收益率低於10%，但其9.4%的ROE也只是差之毫釐。資產規模排名第七的美國合眾銀行(us Bancorp)的加權平均淨資產收益率高達15.4%。相較而言，歐洲銀行在任何一種衡量標準下都表現的不盡人意，無論是ROTE，還是剔除財務槓桿因素（即只考慮股權出資的資產）後的總資產收益率（ROA）。Autonomous Research的研究員斯圖爾特•格雷厄姆(Stuart Graham)提供的數據也證實，美國9大銀行的平均總資產收益率是歐洲24家銀行的兩倍。

注：

ROA: 總資產收益率=（淨利潤）/ 總資產總額，衡量每單位資產創造多少淨利潤的指標，剔除了指標中的槓桿效應。ROE(淨資產收益率) = 淨利潤 / 所有者權益

All this is reflected in stockmarkets’ assessment of the relative worth of European banks. Markets value most big American banks at more than the net book value of their equity; but the shares of most leading European lenders trade below that mark. The price-to-book ratio of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank, which squeaked into profit in 2018 (with an roe of 0.4%) after three years of losses, languishes at a feeble 25%. Deutsche is in merger talks with its neighbour, Commerzbank, which is rated little better, with a ratio of 31%. Unicredit, Italy’s biggest bank, is rumoured to be considering a bid for Commerzbank if the talks with Deutsche stall.

這一切也反映在了對歐洲銀行股價的相對估值之中。市場對大部分美國大銀行的估值高於其股本的賬面淨值；而大部分主要歐洲銀行的股票交易價格卻低於該值。德國第一銀行德意志銀行，在連續三年虧損後最終於2018年扭虧為盈，其淨資產收益率僅為0.4%，市淨率也只徘徊在可憐的25%上下。德意志銀行正與其“鄰居”德國商業銀行進行併購談判，德國商業銀行的市淨率相對稍高，達到31%。據傳，如果該項談判擱置，意大利最大的銀行裕信銀行將考慮投標德商。

Explanations for European banks’ poor performance start with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-08. American banks were swiftly and forcibly recapitalised through the Troubled Asset Relief Programme, whether they needed it or not (“They got TARPed,” in the words of one European banker). Most European countries (though not Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland) were slow to act. The euro area lacked a single supervisor and a common authority for resolving failed banks. Both were established several years later—and only after the euro area’s sovereign debt crises had compounded the troubles of many lenders.

歐洲銀行之所以經營慘淡追根溯源要從2007年至2008年的金融危機說起。在金融危機發生後，美國通過“問題資產救助計劃” 迅速並強制性地對銀行進行了資產重組，不管它們是否需要（用一位歐洲銀行家的話說便是：“他們被‘問題資產救助化’了”）。而大部分歐洲國家（英國、荷蘭、瑞典除外）卻反應遲緩。歐元區缺少一個單一監管者和一個統一管理機構去處理破產銀行。這兩者在幾年之後，並且是在歐洲主權債務危機加劇了大量銀行的困境之後才姍姍遲來。

Banks complain that policymakers have since made their lives hard. In the euro area net interest income, which makes up the bulk of banks’ revenues, has been ground down by slow growth and years of ultralow, even negative, interest rates—banks must pay the European Central Bank (ecb) 0.4% a year to deposit money. In the past three years, reports the eba, net interest margins have fallen from 1.57% to 1.47%. Mario Draghi, the president of the ecb, said on March 27th that “low bank profitability is not an inevitable consequence of negative rates”, although he admitted that the central bank would consider “mitigating the side-effects”. In March the ecb announced further operations to provide banks with cheap long-term finance.

銀行們紛紛抱怨決策者自金融危機之後使得銀行的經營變得舉步維艱。淨利息收入是銀行收益的主要來源，但歐元區銀行的該收入受擠壓嚴重，受累於經濟增長緩慢以及執行多年的超低利率，甚至負利率（銀行向歐洲央行存錢時必須支付每年0.4%費用）。EBA報道稱，過去三年裡，銀行的淨利差已從1.57%將至1.47%。3月27日，歐央行行長馬里奧德拉吉宣稱，“負利率不一定會導致低利潤”，儘管他承認央行可能會考慮採取措施“減輕負面影響”。三月，歐洲央行宣佈將進一步向銀行提供低息的長期貸款。

Bankers also complain about capital requirements. Not only have these been tightened since the financial crisis, but the new rules, known as Basel 3, were finalised only at the end of 2017. Banks are having to raise billions in debt that would be able to absorb losses, should some catastrophe wipe out their equity. Magdalena Stoklosa of Morgan Stanley says that resolution regulation is obliging banks to finance themselves by fairly expensive means when deposits cost them nothing and margins are wafer-thin.

銀行家們也對資金要求的提高頗有怨言。這一要求在金融危機後逐漸收緊，並且由於2017年末出臺的巴塞爾協議Ⅲ而變得更加苛刻。銀行不得不負債籌資數十億作為準備金，以備彌補未來可能發生的股價崩盤災難所造成的損失。來自於摩根斯坦利的Magdalena Stoklosa表示，這一決議正迫使銀行在存款利息為零、收益極其微薄的情況下，還得通過高成本融資渠道獲取資金。

European banks also lack the scale of America’s biggest. Differences among national markets and the eu’s failure to complete its “banking union” thwart cross-border mergers that might create continent-spanning giants. Peer more closely at specific countries, and further burdens on profitability become visible. Banks in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Portugal are still weighed down by bad loans, even if the load is getting lighter. Overcrowding is common; so is competition from publicly owned and co-operative banks, which have other goals besides profit. Germany is the harshest environment on both counts. Even combined, Deutsche and Commerzbank would struggle for elbow room.

歐洲銀行同樣缺乏美國大型銀行的規模。各國市場之間的差異和歐盟建立銀行聯盟的失敗，阻礙了跨境併購及由此產生洲際巨頭的可能性。深入觀察一些特定的國家，就能找到另一些制約盈利能力的負擔因素。塞浦路斯，希臘，意大利以及葡萄牙的銀行仍受著壞賬的拖累，即使這些壞賬負擔正在不斷減輕。銀行過多在這些國家很普遍，來自不以盈利為唯一目標的公有銀行和合作銀行的競爭也普遍存在而這兩類銀行並。從這兩方面中的任一方面來說，德國都堪稱是對商業銀行最嚴苛的市場。即便德銀和德商成功合併，它們也將很難擁有靈活發揮的市場空間。

But struggling banks cannot simply blame history, officialdom and market structure for their troubles. They could do a lot more to help themselves. The eba’s new survey finds, for instance, that at almost three-quarters of European banks, costs consume more than 60% of income. The average cost-income ratio, 64.6%, is higher than it was four years ago.

但是掙扎的銀行們也不能簡單的將他們的問題歸咎於過去，官僚作風以及市場結構。它們自救的方法還有很多。比如據EBA的最新調研發現，大約有四分之三的歐洲銀行的成本佔據了收益的6成。如今64.6%的平均成本收益比遠高於其四年前。

Europe’s most successful banks show what can be done. A study by five ecb economists published last November—and commended to banks by Mr Draghi—found that euro-zone banks which have cut costs, spent heavily on information technology, are geographically diverse (like ing, Santander and bbva, another Spanish bank) and rely less on interest income tend to be more profitable. Banks that carry lower credit risks (ie, that are safer) also do better.

歐洲最成功的銀行們已經指明瞭行動的方向。去年11月，來自歐洲央行的五位經濟學家發表的一項研究發現：歐元區裡那些已經削減成本並在數字化轉型上投入巨大的銀行在地理分佈上具有多樣性（如荷蘭國際集團（ING）、西班牙的桑坦德銀行（Santander）及西班牙畢爾巴鄂-比斯開對外銀行集團（BBVA）），對利息收入的依賴性更低，並且更具盈利能力；同時，信用風險較低（即更安全）的銀行也相對做得更好。Draghi先生向各大銀行推薦了這項研究。

None of this will transform European banking into a magic money tree. Banking everywhere is less lucrative than it was before the crisis. Banks can take some comfort from evidence in the ecb economists’ study and the eba’s survey that coes are coming down, largely as a by-product of persistently low official rates. But bank bosses would be foolish to rely on that—or to suppose that they are not ultimately responsible for their own fates.

當然這些改革並不能使歐洲銀行業搖身一變成為一棵神奇的搖錢樹。對世界各地的銀行業來說，金融危機前那種富到流油的日子都已經一去不復返了。雖然銀行可以依靠上面歐洲央行經濟學家研究中的證據，以及EBA的調研獲知權益資本成本正在下降的利好消息（主要是長期低官方利率所帶來的副產品），從而得到一些安慰，但銀行的決策者們如果僅僅指望著低COE或者認為他們最後不用為自己的命運負責，那麼就真的是蠢到家了。

翻譯組：

Olivia，教育從業者，經濟學人粉絲

Jasmine，稅務，愛笑愛生活愛經濟學人

Leon, 男，金融專業研究生，經濟學人鐵粉

Lucia ，女，翻譯學碩士三年制，經濟學人粉絲

Martina，女，谷歌廣告從業者，愛電影愛生活，愛金融經濟

校核組：

Jessie Lulu, 金融從業者，愛陽光，愛細雨，愛經濟學人

Alex，男，工科研究生，文學與科學愛好者，經濟學人忠實讀者

觀點|評論|思考

本期評論員

Alan，男，金融工程碩士，經濟學人粉絲

歐洲長達十年的低利率環境、歐洲銀行們的過度競爭和歐洲銀行們並沒有在危機後得到類似美國銀行們的救助計劃，這三點可能是歐洲銀行們盈利困難的原因。

歐洲的低利率環境是老生常談了，利率低的原因可能是因為像日本一樣人口老齡化不願消費所以通脹起不來，也可能是因為ECB為了兼顧歐元區拖後腿的各國經濟從而不得不長期將利率壓低。無論什麼原因，低利率確實會傷害銀行的利潤，而負利率更是。銀行的盈利模式是貸款-存款的息差，或者理財產品-存款的息差，因為巴塞爾協議三，對銀行的持有資產的風險有嚴格控制，所以銀行將錢投向能更賺錢的理財產品是被嚴格限制的，這樣它的大多數資金還是隻能用於貸款，而貸款受困於低利率和萎靡的經濟，在幾個國家甚至還是負的。

歐洲並不像美國那樣是一個各地區差異較小聯結緊密的國家，雖然在歐盟商品、貨幣和勞動力都已經在很高程度上可以自由流通了，但是兩千年來的民族性很難改變，各個國家還是有較為顯著的不同偏好，德國人還是愛自家的黑啤意大利人還是愛自家的意麵，很多企業還是更專注於本土化，導致很多歐洲很少出超大型企業，歐洲企業們更多發展成為中型公司或是精品公司（專精特定領域的商品或服務）。於是歐洲的每個國家都有專著本國市場的本國銀行還有將分支機構延伸過來的外國銀行。銀行業是一個需要相對保護避免過度競爭的行業，這一點從歷史上大大小小的銀行業危機已經看出來了，政府一般也會控制銀行的數量以免過度競爭擠壓銀行的利潤導致引發危機。但是從目前來看，在歐洲銀行間的競爭要高於美國銀行們的。

第三點是在危機過後，美國在吸取了過往大蕭條的經驗後，近乎完美得應對了危機。（史上最大宏觀對沖基金創始人Ray Dalio不僅成功預測了08金融危機的到來，還提出了寶貴的應對經驗。

與此相對的是歐洲在發生主權債務危機爆發後才開始應對危機，同時並沒有類似的銀行救助計劃，導致西班牙葡萄牙意大利當時很多銀行的壞賬井噴，而同時歐元區的經濟遲遲不見氣色又讓銀行消化這些壞賬的過程變得緩慢（如果經濟變好銀行貸出去的錢都能收的回來那麼賺到的錢就能更快抵消這些虧損的壞賬了）。

歐洲的銀行們能做的就是將服務越來越多的數字化，提供更好的線上服務削減門店員工開支等以提高競爭力，或者在各國聘請當地人做管理層做到在各國都實現本土化，但是這種建議只能給銀行們，也只有個別銀行可以靠這種策略賺錢，歐洲如果不想要銀行的低利潤率成為下一場危機發生的隱患，最直接的方法還是控制銀行數量和競爭程度。

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