美利堅帝國的衰落
Fall of the American Empire
保羅·克魯格曼
2018年6月20日
DOUG MILLS/THE NEW YORK TIMES
The U.S. government is, as a matter of policy, literally ripping children from the arms of their parents and putting them in fenced enclosures (which officials insist aren’t cages, oh no). The U.S. president is demanding that law enforcement stop investigating his associates and go after his political enemies instead. He has been insulting democratic allies while praising murderous dictators. And a global trade war seems increasingly likely.
美國政府正在執行一項政策，生生把孩子從父母懷裡搶下來，關進圍欄裡（官員們堅稱那不是籠子，絕不是）。美國總統要求執法機構停止調查他的關係人，轉而去追查他的政敵。他一邊讚揚殺人的獨裁者，一邊侮辱民主盟友。而一場全球貿易戰似乎越來越有可能。
What do these stories have in common? Obviously they’re all tied to the character of the man occupying the White House, surely the worst human being ever to hold his position. But there’s also a larger context, and it’s not just about Donald Trump. What we’re witnessing is a systematic rejection of longstanding American values — the values that actually made America great.
這些故事有什麼共同之處？顯然，他們都和白宮那位人物的性格有關，此人肯定是這個位置上有史以來最糟糕的人選。但它們還有一個更大的背景，並不止於唐納德·特朗普。我們正在見證對美國長期價值觀的系統性排斥——正是這些價值觀令美國擁有偉大榮光。
America has long been a powerful nation. In particular, we emerged from World War II with a level of both economic and military dominance not seen since the heyday of ancient Rome. But our role in the world was always about more than money and guns. It was also about ideals: America stood for something larger than itself — for freedom, human rights and the rule of law as universal principles.
美國一直是一個強大的國家。特別是我們在第二次世界大戰後的崛起，當時我們的經濟和軍事優勢達到了自古羅馬鼎盛時期以來所未見的地步。但是，我們在世界上的角色永遠不僅僅關乎金錢和槍炮。它也和理想有關：美國曾經堅持某些比自己更重要的東西——作為普世原則的自由、人權和法治。
Of course, we often fell short of those ideals. But the ideals were real, and mattered. Many nations have pursued racist policies; but when the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal wrote his 1944 book about our “Negro problem,” he called it “An American Dilemma,” because he viewed us as a nation whose civilization had a “flavor of enlightenment” and whose citizens were aware at some level that our treatment of blacks was at odds with our principles.
當然，我們經常達不到這樣的理想。但這些理想是真實的，並且非常重要。許多國家實行種族主義政策；但瑞典經濟學家貢納爾·默達爾(Gunnar Myrdal)把他1944年那本關於美國“黑人問題”的書命名為《美國的困境》(An American Dilemma)，因為他認為我們國家的文明具有“啟蒙氣息”，我們的公民在某種程度上明白，我們對待黑人的態度與我們的原則不符。
And his belief that there was a core of decency — maybe even goodness — to America was eventually vindicated by the rise and success, incomplete as it was, of the civil rights movement.
他相信，美國的核心是正直，甚至是善良，這個信念最終被民權運動的崛起和成功（雖然在當時還不夠徹底）所證實。
But what does American goodness — all too often honored in the breach, but still real — have to do with American power, let alone world trade? The answer is that for 70 years, American goodness and American greatness went hand in hand. Our ideals, and the fact that other countries knew we held those ideals, made us a different kind of great power, one that inspired trust.
美國人經常違背自己的善良，然而它仍是真實的——但是它和美國的力量有什麼關係，何況還有世界貿易？答案是，70年來，美國的善良和美國的偉大是齊頭並進的。我們的理想，以及其他國家知道我們堅持這些理想的事實，令我們成為另一種強大的力量，一種可以激發人們信任的力量。
Think about it. By the end of World War II, we and our British allies had in effect conquered a large part of the world. We could have become permanent occupiers, and/or installed subservient puppet governments, the way the Soviet Union did in Eastern Europe. And yes, we did do that in some developing countries; our history with, say, Iran is not at all pretty.
想想看。到第二次世界大戰結束時，我們和我們的英國盟友實際上征服了世界的很大一部分。我們本可以成為永久性的佔領者，並且（抑或）像蘇聯在東歐所做的那樣，扶持恭順的傀儡政府。是的，我們在一些發展中國家這樣做了。在某些國家，比如說伊朗，我們的歷史並不總是那麼好看。
But what we mainly did instead was help defeated enemies get back on their feet, establishing democratic regimes that shared our core values and became allies in protecting those values.
但我們做得最多的卻是幫助被擊敗的敵人重新站起來，建立民主制度，分享我們的核心價值觀，並且成為保護這些價值觀的盟友。
The Pax Americana was a sort of empire; certainly America was for a long time very much first among equals. But it was by historical standards a remarkably benign empire, held together by soft power and respect rather than force. (There are actually some parallels with the ancient Pax Romana, but that’s another story.)
美利堅治世是一種帝國；在很長一段時間裡，美國在同等國家中肯定居於首位。但是，按照歷史標準來看，這是一個非常仁慈的帝國，它的凝聚力來自軟實力和尊重，而不是力量。（這其實與古代的羅馬治世有些相似之處，但那是另一個故事了。）
And while you might be tempted to view international trade deals, which Trump says have turned us into a “piggy bank that everyone else is robbing,” as a completely separate story, they are anything but. Trade agreements were meant to (and did) make America richer, but they were also, from the beginning, about more than dollars and cents.
你可能會覺得，有必要把國際貿易協議當作另一個完全獨立的故事來看，特朗普說這些協議已經把我們變成一個“被他人搶劫的存錢罐”，然而根本不是這樣。貿易協定的目的是令美國變得更加富有（而且確實如此），但是從一開始，它們就不僅僅是為了金錢。
In fact, the modern world trading system was largely the brainchild not of economists or business interests, but of Cordell Hull, F.D.R.’s long-serving secretary of state, who believed that “prosperous trade among nations” was an essential element in building an “enduring peace.” So you want to think of the postwar creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as part of the same strategy that more or less simultaneously gave rise to the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO.
事實上，建立現代世界貿易體系主要是富蘭克林·D·羅斯福的長期國務卿科德爾·赫爾(Cordell Hull)的想法，而不是出自經濟學家的構思或是從商業利益出發。赫爾認為，“國家之間興旺發達的貿易”是建立“持久和平”的基本要素。因此，戰後《關稅和貿易總協定》(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)的創建與馬歇爾計劃(Marshall Plan)和北約(NATO)的創建，幾乎發生在同一時期，你應當把它們視為同一戰略的組成部分。
So all the things happening now are of a piece. Committing atrocities at the border, attacking the domestic rule of law, insulting democratic leaders while praising thugs, and breaking up trade agreements are all about ending American exceptionalism, turning our back on the ideals that made us different from other powerful nations.
所以現在發生的一切都是一回事。邊境的暴行、攻擊國內法治、侮辱民主領袖、讚揚惡棍、破壞貿易協定，這一切都是要結束美國例外主義，讓我們拋棄那些令我們與其他強大國家不同的理想。
And rejecting our ideals won’t make us stronger; it will make us weaker. We were the leader of the free world, a moral as well as financial and military force. But we’re throwing all that away.
放棄我們的理想不會使我們變得更強大；只會削弱我們。我們曾是自由世界的領導者，是道德的重要力量，也是金融與軍事的重要力量。但是我們正在把所有這一切統統拋棄。
What’s more, it won’t even serve our self-interest. America isn’t nearly as dominant a power as it was 70 years ago; Trump is delusional if he thinks that other countries will back down in the face of his threats. And if we are heading for a full-blown trade war, which seems increasingly likely, both he and those who voted for him will be shocked at how it goes: Some industries will gain, but millions of workers will be displaced.
更何況，它甚至不能為我們自身的利益服務。美國已經遠不是70年前那樣的頭號強國；如果特朗普認為其他國家面臨威脅時會退縮，那他是在妄想。如果我們正在發動一場全面的貿易戰（這看起來越來越有可能），那麼他和那些投他票的人都會對事態的發展感到震驚：一些行業將會獲益，但數百萬工人會失業。
So Trump isn’t making America great again; he’s trashing the things that made us great, turning us into just another bully — one whose bullying will be far less effective than he imagines.
所以特朗普並不是在恢復美國的偉大榮光。他是在破壞那些令我們偉大的東西，把我們變成另一個霸凌者——而霸凌所收到的效果遠遠低於他的想象。
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