十年前，金融危機席捲全球，後危機時代已然開啟。如今，十年後再回望，金融危機究竟如何改變了這個世界？為此，

十年前的金融危機席捲了全球，開創了我們今天所處的所謂後危機時代。十年回望，金融危機究竟改變了什麼？

記得危機剛剛爆發的時候，美國金融界的思想家們比如債券之王Bill Gross先生曾提出，後危機時代將有三大主題，再規制化reregulation，去槓桿deleverage和去全球化deglobalization。這份預言實現了多少？

再規制化曾被猶猶豫豫、三心二意地嘗試了一下，然後堅決地放棄了：金融危機的罪人們並沒有坐牢，而是被救助了，成功地保住了他們的獎金和自由，其中一些人甚至保住了他們的職位。

美歐的高槓杆，十年來發生了轉移而不是下降，先是讓公共部門大幅擴張了債務以承接金融部門和私人部門轉移出來的債務和虧空，然後是利用美元和歐元的特權將債務利率壓到零乃至負利率，從而將數萬億美元的虧空轉化為全球外圍地區的高通脹。

當年預言的三個主題中，只有去全球化正在切實發生，2016年特朗普當選總統和英國脫歐公投，標誌著自1979年開始向全世界佈道全球化福音的盎格魯薩克森民族，如今掉轉槍口攻擊自己當年提倡的全球化。新自由主義的全球化被它自己的母國給拋棄了，成為二十一世紀的思想棄兒。民粹主義、孤立主義、保護主義取代了開放、多元、平等、創新等一系列全球化精神。

這個世界在後金融危機的十年間迅速顛倒過來，全球化課堂裡的學生變成了老師。在達沃斯向全世界宣傳繼續開放市場的好處，在各種場合維護多邊治理體系和全球氣候治理，並正在中國國內付出巨大政策和財政代價鼓勵創新和環保。IMF的拉加德女士發現自己跟中國領導人而不是華盛頓特區的政府擁有更多的共同語言：前者正在爭取IMF中更多份額，更大發言權，並樂意承擔更大的責任；而美國至少一半國民將其先輩們一手建立的一眾多邊機構視為低效、負擔和累贅。IMF的經濟學家們也不再像以前那樣執著於資本項目的開放，而中國恰恰在努力讓其匯率和利率獲得彈性和自主性，並審慎卻又堅定地放開其資本項目。

據說IMF的章程中明確規定其總部應該設在經濟規模最大的成員國。考慮到中國經濟未來數年的增速、通脹、統計方式的調整和匯率升值前景，我估計早則2021年，晚則2025年，人們就會面臨一個嚴肅的選擇題：IMF和世界銀行的第二總部應該選址上海浦東還是北京南邊的雄安新區？我的建議是選址雄安新區，不僅是因為它離北京的中國財政部和國家開發銀行只有半小時的高鐵，風光秀美，建築全新，而且更重要的是，上海實在不適宜人類在冬季居住。它的冬季最低溫會在零下5度左右，但是由於地處淮河以南，而中國是不允許淮河以南區域在冬季集中供暖的，所以作為從小生活在上海附近的人，在我記憶中，長江沿線的人們過冬取暖主要靠抖。那麼誰適合去上海呢？我建議自由女神不妨搬過去，因為這位來自法國的（非法？）移民長期徘徊在紐約市大門口，刻在其基座上的詞語已經在美國顯得相當不合時宜。假如自由女神搬到長江口的長興島，她將得以見證腳下的造船基地如何快速建造出人類歷史上最壯觀的海軍艦隊，從而守護一個更加開放的全球航海和貿易秩序。

顛倒過來的除了開放議題，還有節能減排環保理念。2007年，當我在布魯塞爾一所大學工作的時候，我曾與中國駐歐盟使團的朋友們聊起氣候變化，我們一致認為這是歐洲的陰謀：他們在推動此項全球議題，不僅有利於歐盟的全球道義領導地位，同時又有利於歐洲的新能源和環保產業。歐洲人施壓中國人與之共同搞節能減排，一定是想剝奪我們淮河以南的中國人過冬取暖的權利。然而，隨著中國在節能環保和新能源產業的進步，這種陰謀論已經從我的頭腦中消失了。不對，事實上這種陰謀論沒有消失，而是悄悄轉移到了地球的另一端：十年後的今天，美國有不少朋友認為是中國人在陰謀推動綠色環保節能減排的國際議題，以便謀取產業上的好處；他們相信氣候變暖是一個偽科學假新聞；多開採煤炭和石油有利於改善美國經濟結構。

甚至在創新和互聯網領域，中國的角色也正在發生變化。多年前聽過個笑話說，萬維網被分為兩部分：全球網和中國互聯網。但是站在今天的全球互聯網發展和治理水平來看，中國的主張和政策路徑恐怕不無道理。200年前，報紙等大眾媒體的崛起使得各社會內絕大多數識字人口都被各自的主流意識形態所覆蓋，從而出現了政治學上所謂的“大眾政治”，人們的意識形態分佈呈現鍾型曲線狀態，換言之，社會共識很強大且穩定。但是在互聯網時代，尤其是移動互聯網時代，傳統媒體被網絡信息邊緣化，普通個體從信息的接受者變成了傳播者和加工者，人們不再被媒體精英洗腦而是自我尋找信源從而自我洗腦，於是我們這個時代的主流意識形態出現了劇烈的分裂，社會共識迅速瓦解。許多國家的政治動盪和社會分裂恐怕同移動互聯網和即時通信時代的到來不無關係，而中國的信息管控和審查雖然有明顯的代價，但是至少人們相對少受氾濫的假消息假新聞之困擾，社會共識比較穩定。不但是政治，從商業和產業角度看，中國的互聯網發展道路也是成功的：隨著時間的推移，原先在互聯網領域的保護主義者、模仿者、閉關自守者中國，正在悄悄地改變其被動地位，開始對外輸出其網絡服務和品牌。除美國之外的絕大多數國家在網絡經濟和人工智能領域都沒有真正發展起有競爭力的品牌和企業來，唯獨能夠同美國的互聯網巨頭們相抗衡的可能主要是中國的少數幾家BAT企業。互聯網應用轉移到手機平臺之際，中國的網絡企業似乎有反超之勢，不止一位歐洲來華留學生告訴我，當他們回到歐洲時才意識到帶著現金或者信用卡上街是多麼老土、多麼落後、多麼不安全。深圳的一位IT業企業家則說，他去年夏天前往硅谷住了三個月，試圖學習硅谷的新思想新模式，但是等他回到深圳的時候，他發現自己已經落伍了。

在持續了十年的負利率和超低利率之後，西方經濟體正在看到走出後危機時代的曙光。日本央行開始縮減長期國債的購買。十年來美日歐依靠什麼產業走出後危機時代？答案可能還是央行。一個悖論在於，後危機時代的美日歐央行大幅擴大其資產負債表，或者說印了很多鈔票以兜住其資不抵債的金融機構和公共部門，但是他們的匯率貶值了嗎？沒有！大幅貶值的是發展中國家的貨幣，印度、巴西、俄羅斯等等。這讓我們想起美國前財政部長的那句名言，這是我們的貨幣，卻是你們的問題。用自己的本幣借債，是發達國家才擁有的特權，如今中國的人民幣正在努力加入這個特權俱樂部，通過人民幣的國際化來改變自己在這個無（硬）錨貨幣體系中的不利地位。

當然，十年來中國地位的改變並沒有讓她變得更加自由主義而是對自己的文明和制度更加自信。中國政治家和知識分子開始意識到西方新自由主義的弊病和誇張之處，最典型的代表是我的朋友李世默先生在TED上的那篇演講。中國人曾經認真地向前蘇聯學習，希望他們教導的全能主義體系能夠幫助中國迅速站起來；80年代開始中國又真誠地向美國和西方學習，希望他們教導的自由市場模式能讓中國富起來。這兩位老師完成了他們的任務，但是這位學生卻發現老師們其實也不完美，蘇聯太窮太專制，而美國太弱太混亂。現在，中國人開始把目光投向歐洲，但是這次的目光不再是仰視，而是平視，中國希望與歐洲大國一起復興絲綢之路，探索一條融合市場效率與政府管控能力的第三條道路。全球化能否獲得新生，希望可能就在歐洲和中國之間。

以下為英文原文：

A World Turned Upside Down

What changes has the financial crisis wrought over the past decade? When the crisis broke out in 2007–2008, US financial commentators such as Bill Gross, the American investor and fund manager, known as ‘the king of bonds’, foresaw three major themes in the post-crisis era: greater regulation, deleverage and deglobalisation. To what extent have these predictions come true?

Regulation was applied – irresolutely – and failed. The real culprits of the financial crisis were not jailed but exonerated. They successfully preserved their freedom – and their wealth – with some even retaining their positions.

High leverage in the US and Europe over the past decade has merely been transferred rather than decreased. This leverage first forced the public sector to significantly expand its debt to incorporate loans and deficits diverted by the financial and private sectors; the US and European countries then capitalised on the privileges of the US dollar and the euro to push the debt interest rates down to zero or negative, turning trillions of dollars of deficit into high inflation in the global periphery.

Of Gross’s three predicted themes, at that time, only deglobalisation was actually happening. Populism, isolationism and protectionism replaced the global spirit of ‘opening‑up’, pluralism, equality and innovation. The election of Donald Trump as US president and the UK’s decision in 2016 to leave the European Union highlight the major Western powers’ repudiation of the ideas of globalisation they had endorsed since the term was first conceived in 1979. Neoliberal globalisation has been abandoned by its own creators and has become a discarded theory in the 21st century.

A world in reverse gear

The world rapidly went into decline in the decade following the financial crisis, when the students of globalisation became its teachers and the developing countries that had previously followed the West’s guidance in promoting globalisation began to set the benchmark for its implementation. He also supported implementation of multilateral governance systems and global climate governance, and is now encouraging innovation and environmental protection, managed through huge financial cost and policy reform. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) managing director, Christine Lagarde, has found more common ground with Chinese leaders than those in the US. China seeks a larger share, a louder voice and greater responsibilities in the IMF, whereas at least half of US citizens view such multinational institutions as inefficient and burdensome. The IMF’s economists are no longer as dedicated to the liberalisation of capital accounts, although their Chinese counterparts are struggling to inject flexibility and autonomy into exchange and interest rates, and to prudently but firmly release funds for its capital projects.

The IMF’s constitution stipulates that its headquarters should be located in the member country with the largest economy. In light of the growth of the Chinese economy, adjustments in statistical methods and the prospect of exchange rate appreciation, it is believed that, as early as 2021, a serious decision will need to be made on the location of the second headquarters of the IMF and the World Bank – slated to be either Pudong in Shanghai or the Xiong’an New Area south of Beijing.

In a world turned upside down, an interesting reversal has occurred in energy and emissions reduction. A decade ago, some in China were dubious of the policy of ‘going green’. Its progress, driven by the EU, was conducive to the EU’s global moral leadership and its new energy and environmental industries, yet would deprive Chinese people south of the Huai River of winter heating. However, with the improvement of China’s energy saving and environmental protection policies, and the development in new energy industries, this doubt waned. However, it has re-emerged in the US, where it is often claimed that China conspires to push for green energy conservation and emissions reduction merely to attain industrial benefits, that global warming is believed to be pseudoscience – or ‘fake news’ – and that only more coal and oil can upgrade the economic structure in the US.

In China, perhaps the most enduring changes since 2008 are those in its industrial structure and its competitiveness. Ten years ago, China’s GDP was less that of Japan, and ranked third in the world. China’s export commodities were predominantly labour-intensive, and its so-called ‘high-tech’ products were the assembly of high-tech components of other countries – such as the assembly export industry of Apple mobile phones in Foxconn in Taiwan. But today, most consumer goods in US supermarkets are no longer sourced from China, but Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh and even Africa. China has made great strides, ascending several steps in the industrial ladder. In the Apple mobile phone supply chain, Chinese manufacturers are not simply assemblers, but providers of dozens of important components, with the previously commonplace tag of ‘made in China’ gradually being transformed into ‘made by China’. China’s self-branded and patented products have proved their own competitiveness in many fields, including electric vehicles, smartphones, drones and high-speed trains.

China is also playing an enhanced role in the fields of innovation and the internet. There used to be a joke that the World Wide Web could be divided into two parts: the global network and the Chinese internet. However, as a consequence of current global internet development and a lack of governance, China’s policies and its reasons for their implementation may prove to be reasonable. Around 200 years ago, the advent of newspapers and other mass media attempted to shape the opinion of the majority of literate people to mainstream ideologies, resulting in ‘mass politics’. Now, the traditional media is marginalised by network information, and individuals have become the communicators and processors of information rather than recipients, breaking down control by media elites. A fierce split in mainstream ideology has accelerated the collapse of a Western social consensus. In China, despite the drawbacks of information control and censorship, the proliferation of fake news has had little effect, and the social consensus is relatively stable.

China plays catch-up

China’s development in IT is also proving successful in business and industry – China, the former protectionist, imitator and isolator in the internet field, is shedding its passive status and beginning to export its network services and brands to the world. Most countries are not developing seriously competitive brands and businesses in the network economy and artificial intelligence; only China’s Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent can compete with the US internet giants and, as internet applications move to mobile platforms, China’s internet companies have the potential to overtake them. More than one European student in China has told the author that, on their return to Europe, they realised how old-fashioned, unsophisitcated and insecure shopping with cash and credit cards is. An IT entrepreneur in Shenzhen told the author that when he visited Silicon Valley for three months to explore new ideas, he found that, on his return to Shenzhen, the pace of innovation and technological development meant that he was already behind the times, and his knowledge and ideas were outdated.

After a decade of negative and ultra-low interest rates, Western economies are now seeing light at the end of the tunnel of the post-crisis era. For example, the Bank of Japan has started to trim purchases of long-term government bonds. Over the past 10 years, what have the US, Japan and Europe relied on most to lift them out of the post-crisis era? The answer is probably their central banks. Paradoxically, the central banks of the US, Japan and Europe have dramatically expanded their balance sheets by printing money to bail out insolvent financial institutions and the public sector – but their exchange rates have not significantly depreciated. Countries struggling with significant currency devaluation include India, Brazil, Russia and other developing economies. In 1971, after the ‘Nixon shock’ – when then-USPresident Richard Nixon undertook a number of economic measures, including cancelling the direct international convertibility of the US dollar to gold – then-US Treasury secretary John Connally declared: “This is our currency, but it is your problem.”

Debt borrowing in its own currency is a privilege enjoyed only by developed countries; China is now working hard to join that club by converting its disadvantaged position in this no (hard) anchor currency system through the internationalisation of the renminbi.

The change in China’s status over the past decade has not made it more liberal, but more confident of its own civilisation and system. Chinese politicians and intellectuals have begun to realise the shortcomings and exaggerations of Western neoliberalism. China learned first from the former Soviet Union that totalitarianism would strengthen China rapidly. From the 1980s onwards, China learned from the US that the free-market model would make China prosperous. Yet China – the student of these policical and economic policies – found that its teachers were not perfect: the Soviet Union was too poor and despotic, while the US is too chaotic. Now, China turns its eyes to Europe, this time not looking up, but head-on. China hopes to revive the ancient Silk Route together with the major European powers and explore the ‘third way’ of integrating market efficiency and government control. Can globalisation gain a new life? Europe and China hold the key.

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